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FABLES OF THE CUYAHOGA:
RECONSTRUCTING A HISTORY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Jonathan H. Adler*
City after city, state after state, had essentially failed in their
efforts to protect their air and their water, the land, the health of
their citizens. By 1970, our city skylines were so polluted that in
many places it was all but impossible to see from one city skyscraper
to another.... We had rivers that were fouled with raw sewage and
toxic chemicals. One actually caught on fire. There was a very fa-
mous photograph from my teenage years of the Cuyahoga River
burning. In fact, it was memorialized in a song at the time.
- Former EPA Administrator Carol Browner'
Cleveland, even now I can remember
'Cause the Cuyahoga River
Goes smokin' through my dreams
Burn on, big river, burn on.
-Randy Newman
2
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tion, April 7-9, 2002. The author would like to thank Jonathan En-
tin, Roger Meiners, Andrew Morriss, Dale Nance, Robert Strassfeld,
and Serina Vandegrift for comments on various drafts of this article,
and give special thanks to Lisa Peters and Andrea Budd for their
extensive research assistance. Any mistakes or omissions are solely
those of the author.
1. Carol M. Browner, Environmental Protection: Meeting the
Challenges of the Twenty-First Century, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv.
329, 330-331 (2001).
2. RANDY NEWMAN, Burn On, on SAIL AWAY (Warner Bros.
Records 1972). It's likely that the river's plight also inspired the
band R.E.M. See R.E.M., Cuyahoga, on LIFE'S RICH PAGEANT
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INTRODUCTION
On June 22, 1969, just before noon, an oil slick and assorted debris
under a railroad trestle on the Cuyahoga River caught fire. 3 The fire
attracted national media attention, including stories in Time,4 and
National Geographic.5 Although the 1969 fire was never broadcast,
as no cameras arrived in time to film the event, its impact was im-
mense. The image of a river ablaze was seared into the nation's
emerging environmental consciousness. 6 Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) Administrator Carol Browner probably spoke for
many Americans when she said "I will never forget a photograph of
flames, fire, shooting right out of the water in downtown Cleveland.
(EMD/Capitol 1986)(" Underneath the river bed we burned the river
down .... Cuyahoga; Cuyahoga gone.").
3. Oil Slick Fire Damages 2 River Spans, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, June 23, 1969, at C1.
4. The Cities: The Price of Optimism, TIME, Aug. 1, 1969, at 41.
Ironically, the picture accompanying the Time magazine story was
from the Cuyahoga River fire of 1952, not 1969.
5. Sad, Soiled Waters: The Cuyahoga River and Lake Erie,
NAT'L GEO., Dec. 1970, at 743-44. The fire 1969 was the subject of
a New York Times story filed on June 28. This story did not run in
all editions of the paper, however, and is not available in the New
York Times archive. See Cleveland River So Dirty It Burns, NEW
YORK TIMES, June 28, 1969 (copy on file with National Geographic
Society).
The fire even attracted international attention. See Water Pol-
lution - 1970, Part 2: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Air and
Water Pollution of the Committee on Public Works, U.S. Senate,
91st Congress (1970) at 412 (testimony of the Honorable Carl B.
Stokes) [hereinafter Stokes Testimony].
6. One commentator noted the river "burned on newscasts all
over the world," and became "a vivid symbol of the state of many of
America's waterways." MARY GRAHAM, THE MORNING AFTER
EARTH DAY: PRACTICAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 28 (1999) (quot-
ing unnamed Cleveland State University professor). The fire has
even inspired a beer. The Great Lakes Brewing Company in Cleve-
land, Ohio, produces a "Burning River Pale Ale."
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It was the summer of 1969 and the Cuyahoga River was burning." 7
A river on fire was a symbol of earth in need of repair, and federal
regulation was the reparative tool of choice.
That a river could become so polluted to ignite proved that state
and local governments and common law environmental protections
were incapable of ensuring adequate levels of environmental protec-
tion. As Drew Caputo of the Natural Resources Defense Council
noted, "when the rivers are on fire, you know things are bad."8 Fol-
lowing on the heels of several best-selling books warning of ecologi-
cal apocalypse and other high-profile events such as the oil spill off
the coast of Santa Barbara, the 1969 Cuyahoga fire spurred efforts to
enact sweeping federal environmental legislation.9 Among the laws
that resulted was the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, a
fact noted in a recent Supreme Court opinion.'
0
7. Quoted in Kristina M. Tridico, Sustainable America in the
Twenty-First Century: A Critique of President Clinton 's Council on
Sustainable Development, 14 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 205,
252 n.7 (1998-99).
8. Drew Caputo, A Job Half Finished: The Clean Water Act Af-
ter 25 Years, 27 ENVTL. REP. 10574, 10576 (1997).
9. Jack A. Seamonds, In Cleveland, Clean Waters Give New
Breath of Life, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 18, 1984, at 68
("Many believe the 1969 fire lit the fuse that put the bank in the na-
tionwide campaign to clean up the environment."); Michael Grun-
wald, EPA Mulls New Water Cleanup Rule, WASH. POST, July 13,
2002, at Al (noting the Clean Water Act "was passed in 1972 after
the Cuyahoga River caught fire in Cleveland"); John Kuehner, 30
Years Acgo, Polluted Cuyahoga Had No Fish; Now They 're Thriv-
ing, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 18, 2002, at B2; Kristina M.
Tridico, Sustainable America in the Twenty-First Century: A Cri-
tique of President Clinton 's Council on Sustainable Development, 14
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 205, 252 n.7 (1998-99) (quoting
Carol Browner: "An angry nation called to action, and the Clean
Water Act was passed."). See also Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening
of America and the Graying of United States Environmental Law:
Reflections on Environmental Law's First Three Decades in the
United States, 20 VA ENVTL. L.J. 75, 79 (2001).
10. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 174-75 (2001) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) ("In 1969, the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio, coated
2002]
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Today, the 1969 fire is regularly referenced in discussions of envi-
ronmental quality. The image endures as a symbol of rampant envi-
ronmental despoliation prior to the enactment of federal environ-
mental laws. That fires no longer burn is an oft-cited sign of envi-
ronmental progress, a factoid that is repeated with "numbing predict-
ability" in speeches commemorating Earth Day or the passage of
landmark environmental legislation.' "The days of rivers bursting
into flame and lakes dying are behind us," noted EPA Administrator
Browner in recent Congressional testimony.' 2 The comparison be-
tween oil-covered waters aflame and comparatively clean waterways
in much of the nation is "dramatic,'1 3 to say the least.
with a slick of industrial waste, caught fire. Congress responded to
that dramatic event, and to others like it, by enacting the Federal Wa-
ter Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) Amendments of 1972").
11. Mary Gade, When the States Come Marching In, 10 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 3 (Winter 1996) ("As virtually every Earth Day
speaker notes with numbing predictability (myself, included), the
Cuyahoga River no longer bums"). See, e.g., Building On Success -
Going Beyond Regulation, Presentation of G. Tracy Mehan, Assis-
tant Administrator, U.S. EPA, Environmental Economics Advisory
Committee, Nov. 30, 2001, available at
http://www.epa.gov/water/speeches/1 13001 tm.html (last visited Jan.
10, 2003) (recalling Cuyahoga River fires); Remarks by Vice Presi-
dent Al Gore on the 25th Anniversary of the Clean Water Act, Oct.
18, 1997, available at
http://clinton3.nara.gov/wh/eop/ovp/speeches/clean.html. See also
The Clean Water Act at 30, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 22, 2002, at A30
("Thirty years ago the nation's waters were in terrible shape - Lake
Erie on its deathbed, Ohio's Cuyahoga River bursting into flames,
lakes streams and beaches closed to fishing and swimming. There
has been great progress since then, almost entirely the result of the
1972 law.").
12. Testimony of Carol Browner, Administrator, U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Feb. 23, 2000, available at 2000 WL
11068367.
13. See, e.g., Robert Jerome Glennon & John E. Thorson, Federal
Environmental Restoration Initiatives: An Analysis of Agency Per-
formance and the Capacity for Change, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 483, 498
(2000) ("Nonetheless, the change in the nation's lakes and rivers
since 1972 has been quite dramatic. In 1972, cities regularly dumped
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Much of the Cuyahoga story, however, is mythology, a fable with
powerfil symbolic force. 14 The river did bum in 1969 - as it and
other rivers had burned many times before - and today the Cuyahoga
and many U.S. rivers are far less polluted. But so much else of what
we "know" about the 1969 fire simply is not so. The conventional
narratives, of a river abandoned by its local community, of water
pollution at its zenith, of conventional legal doctrines impotent in the
face of environmental harms, and of a beneficent federal government
rushing in to save the day, is misleading in many respects. Revisit-
ing the context and history of the legendary Cuyahoga River fire
reveals a more complex story about the causes and consequences of
various institutional choices in environmental law. Like the waters
of the Cuyahoga in 1969, the historical record is murky - far more so
than the traditional fable suggests.
This paper revisits the fable - or rather fables - of the Cuyahoga
and their implications for environmental law. The actual history of
the Cuyahoga River fire raises many questions about institutional
choice for pollution control. Whether the history of the Cuyahoga
River supports the conventional thesis that federal command-and-
control regulation was the optimal means of addressing water pollu-
tion problems in 1969 should be an open question. Told in greater
detail, the story of the Cuyahoga casts doubt on the conventional
justifications for the federal environmental controls enacted in the
fire's wake. The river did catch fire in 1969 - or, more properly, oil
and debris floating on the river's surface caught fire - but this was
not clearly due to state and local malfeasance or a failure of common
law protections. And, while federal intervention likely did acceler-
raw sewage into harbors and rivers. Industrial pollution seriously
degraded many rivers. In 1969, the Cuyahoga River in Ohio literally
caught fire. Today, municipal water treatment plants have all but
eliminated the discharge of sewage into watercourses. End-of-the-
pipe limits on toxic chemicals have significantly reduced industrial
pollution.").
14. The use of the term "fable" is deliberate, connoting a fictitious
narrative that nonetheless conveys an important truth. See, e.g.,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 415 (10th ed. 1998)
(defining a fable as "a fictitious narrative or statement: as," among
other things, "a narration intended to enforce a useful truth."). The
fables of the Cuyahoga are narratives of the river's plight which pur-
portedly explain the evolution of federal water pollution controls.
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ate river cleanup in many parts of the country, there are still reasons
to question the federal government's record with regard to the Cuya-
hoga, and river quality generally.
This article is not intended as a comprehensive treatment of the
federalization of environmental protection, or even a complete his-
tory of the pressures that led to the enactment of the Clean Water
Act. Nor does it provide an extensive comparison of federal regula-
tion and other policy alternatives. Rather this article is an explora-
tion of the nature of the choices our nation has made in environ-
mental law guided by events on and around a single river. The aim
is to provide additional perspective to the questions of institutional
choice which underlie environmental policy, and to suggest that the
decision to reallocate primary authority over water quality to the
federal government was neither inevitable nor an unmitigated bless-
ing. 15
I. FABLES OF THE CUYAHOGA
The June 22, 1969 fire on the Cuyahoga is the "seminal" event in
the history of water pollution control in America, helping to spur the
growth of the environmental movement and the passage of national
environmental legislation. 16 "Never before had an image so thor-
15. Although most federal environmental statutes, including the
Clean Water Act, operate on a "cooperative federalism" model,
much about the implementation of these programs is anything but
cooperative. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, The Green Aspects of
Printz: The Revival of Federalism and Its Implications for Environ-
mental Law, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 573, 575-582 (1998).
16. According to the EPA, "[t]he burning Cuyahoga came to
symbolize for this country a century of industrialization with little or
no regard for environmental consequences. It also was one of the
seminal events that gave rise to the environmental movement, the
creation of the EPA, and the passage of a series of laws designed to
safeguard our environment, including the enactment of the Clean
Water Act in 1972." U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Liquid
Assets 2000: Good News, Bad News - The Current Condition of our
Nation's Water Resources, available at
http://www.epa.gov/ow/liquidassets/goodnews.html (last visited
Aug. 18, 2002). Prominent Clean Water Act experts also refer to the
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oughly driven home the deteriorating plight of our nation's water-
ways," one environmental group explained on the fire's thirtieth an-
niversary. "The burning river mobilized the nation and became a
rallying point for passage of the Clean Water Act."' 17 Despite its
national importance as a symbol of environmental decline, the 1969
fire on the Cuyahoga was a relatively minor story in Cleveland at the
time.18 For northeast Ohio, and indeed for many industrialized ar-
eas, burning rivers were nothing new, and the 1969 fire was less se-
vere than prior Cuyahoga conflagrations. It was a little fire on a
long-polluted river already embarked on the road to recovery.
Water pollution in the 1960s was a major environmental problem
throughout the nation. Many rivers were declared industrial streams,
used predominantly for commercial purposes and the disposal of
industrial waste. Yet it would be wrong to view the fire as evidence
that U.S. water quality reached its nadir in the late 1960s. In all like-
lihood, many measures of water quality hit rock bottom well before
1969, though the lack of comprehensive data makes it difficult to test
such a claim. By 1969, efforts were already underway to reduce
pollution and restore water quality in many water bodies, including
the Cuyahoga. Cleveland had embarked on a long and costly
cleanup effort before the Cuyahoga became a national symbol. Sub-
sequent federal efforts received more attention - and far more credit
- but it appears the tide was turning well before Congress enacted
the 1972 Clean Water Act. One problem Cleveland faced was that
the Cuyahoga was treated as an industrial stream, and state permits
inhibited local clean up efforts. Public nuisance actions and en-
forcement of local pollution ordinances, in particular, were pre-
1969 fire as the "most dramatic alarm bell" that "water pollution had
reached crisis proportions" and a federal Clean Water Act was nec-
essary. ROBERT W. ADLER, JESSICA C. LANDMAN & DIANE M.
CAMERON, THE CLEAN WATER ACT: 20 YEARS LATER 5 (1993). See
also David Lore, Cuyahoga River's Cleanup Reclaims 'Hallowed
Ground', COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 8, 2002, at 7A ("Although
quickly extinguished, the fire made the Cuyahoga the national poster
child for abused rivers."). See also sources cited at note 9.
17. American Rivers, Anniversary of Cuyahoga River Burning,
June 21, 1999, at
http://www.amnivers.org/pressrelease/presscuyahoga6.21.99.html
(last visited Aug. 26, 2002).
18. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
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cluded by state regulation, while federal laws protecting commer-
cially navigable waterways went largely unenforced. Thus, insofar
as the story of the Cuyahoga is to inform our views of the viability
of local efforts and common law environmental protections, it illus-
trates that sometimes when local institutions and common law reme-
dies failed, they may have been sabotaged or ignored.
A. Burning the River Down
Shortly before noon on June 22, oil and debris floating on the river
caught fire as it drifted below two railroad trestles southeast of
downtown Cleveland. Though reportedly intense - the flames are
said to have been five-stories high - the blaze was under control
within thirty minutes. 19 The heat of the flames warped railroad ties
on one of the crossings, but total damage was estimated at only
$50,000.20 Although noted on the front page of the Cleveland Plain
Dealer, the fire was a minor news item.21 The Plain Dealer's story
was a mere five paragraphs long and buried inside on page 11 -C,22
hardly the placement for a major news item. The fire also received
scant coverage in the Cleveland Press, Cleveland's other daily
newspaper at the time. The Press only ran a small photo of railroad
tracks on the front page with a one paragraph caption.23 By contrast,
earlier river fires, such as a major conflagration in 1952, were trum-
peted under banner headlines.24 Reflecting on the 1969 fire, the
most remarkable thing about it in the head of the fire department's
19. Oil Slick Fire Damages 2 River Spans, supra note 3.
20. Id. The fire reportedly caused $45,000 damage to a railroad
bridge owned by Norfolk & Western Railway Company, and an ad-
ditional $5,000 damage to another bridge owned by the Newburgh &
South Shore Railroad Company.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. The Cuyahoga River Caught Fire, CLEVELAND PRESS, June
23, 1969, at 1.
24. See, e.g., Oil Slick Fire Ruins Flats Shipyard; Flames Hit Dry
Docks, Three Tugs, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 2, 1952, at 1.
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view was just how "unremarkable" it was. 2 5 Another former fire-
fighter recalled that the small blaze "wasn't that big a deal."26
However mild the actual fire may have been, it "gave a third-
degree burn to Cleveland's image." 27  The fire received national
coverage in the media. The coverage in Time was particularly harsh,
painting a grim picture of Cleveland and its burning river:
Some river! Chocolate-brown, oily, bubbling with sub-
surface gases, it oozes rather than flows. "Anyone who
falls into the Cuyahoga does not drown," Cleveland's
citizens joke grimily. "He decays." The Federal Water
Pollution Control Administration dryly notes: "The lower
Cuyahoga has no visible life, not even low forms such as
leeches and sludge worms that usually thrive on wastes."
It is also--literally--a fire hazard. A few weeks ago, the
oil-slicked river burst into flames and burned with such
intensity that two railroad bridges spanning it were nearly
destroyed. "What a terrible reflection on our city," said
Cleveland Mayor Carl Stokes sadly.
28
Although the image of the 1969 fire is supposed to have spurred the
nation to action, few Americans have ever seen a picture of the in-
famous event. The fire was so quick that by the time local photogra-
phers arrived, the flames were out. The photo in the Cleveland Plain
Dealer showed a fireboat spraying down a railroad trestle after the
fire was under control. 29 The Cleveland Press could only run a
photo of the railroad ties warped by the heat of the flames. 30 There
25. Roger Brown, 1969 River Blaze Scarred Image, CLEVELAND
PLAIN DEALER, June 18, 1969, at 1-B.
26. Cleveland Balks at Celebrating 20h Anniversary of Cuyahoga
River Fire, Associated Press, June 18, 1989, available at 1989 WL
4042779.
27. Jack A. Seamonds, In Cleveland, Clean Waters Give New
Breath of Life, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 18, 1984, at 68.
28. The Cities: The Price of Optimism, supra note 4, at 41.
29. See Oil Slick Fire Damages 2 River Spans, supra note 3. See
also photo, available at http://www.cwru.edu/
artsci/engl/marling/60s/pages/richoux/69Realphoto.html (last visited
Jan. 9, 2003)(showing no smoke or fire visible in picture).
30. The Cuyahoga River Caught Fire, supra note 23.
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may have been "considerable television news coverage" 3' of the
story, but there were no "pictures at eleven" - or on any other broad-
cast. No television crews arrived in time to broadcast the spectacle
of a river ablaze.
There is a famous photo of the Cuyahoga River on fire. It accom-
panied the August 1 Time magazine story.32 This striking photo of a
fireboat fighting a river aflame is probably the photo some Ameri-
cans remember and is most likely the photo that Carol Browner re-
ferred to above.33 It is also reproduced as "evidence" of the horrific
1969 fire.34 Yet despite Time's characterization, it was not a picture
of the June 1969 fire at all. Rather, it was an old archive photo of
the river blaze of 1952, a true inferno that caused substantial dam-
age. 35 The vision of a river aflame that many Americans may asso-
ciate with the 1969 fire is itself one fable of the Cuyahoga.
31. Lazarus, supra note 9, at 79. See also, Donna Frye, Clean
Water Act after 30 Years, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Oct. 18,
2002, at B7 ("Images of rivers burning.., were broadcast on televi-
sion and captured in photographs in newspapers and magazines.").
32. See The Cities: The Price of Optimism, supra note 4, at 41.
33. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Sierra Club, The Clean Water Act at 30, October 17,
2002, http://www.sierraclub.org/currents/cleanwater act.asp (last
visited October 25, 2002) (claiming that the June 1969 fire was "cap-
tured on film" alongside reproduction of 1952 photo from Time
magazine). This was not the only error in the Sierra Club's account.
It also claims that the fire "sent flames soaring five stories high and
floating past downtown Cleveland to Lake Erie." After correspon-
dence with the author, the text on the site was changed, and a cor-
rected photo caption added.
35. See, e.g., "1952 Cuyahoga River on Fire," available at
http://www.cwru.edu/artsci/engl/marling/60s/pages/ichoux/5OsFire
Picture.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2003). This is hardly the only mis-
characterization of the 1969 fire. One environmental history claims
that in 1969 the river burned for eight days! RICHARD N. L.
ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENV'T, MANAGING OURSELVES - A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 224 (1999). See
also ELIZABETH WHELAN, TOXIC TERROR 225 (1985) (claiming that
"In 1959 [sic] the river burned for eight days, as flames fed on hosts
of industrial wastes that had been carelessly discharged on a regular
basis").
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B. The Fires Last Time
The Cuyahoga's problems were not new in the 1960s, nor had they
been created overnight. Debris readily accumulated in the "crooked"
river, and the slow movement of the water reduced its assimilative
capacity, especially near the mouth.36 When the local population
and industrial growth exploded in the Nineteenth Century, pollution
was sure to follow. 37 Before the end of the Civil War there were
twenty refineries in the Cleveland area, including John D. Rockefel-
ler's Excelsior Works.38 Such facilities were anything but sanitary.
Fires were common, and the unusable fraction of refined crude was
often dumped into the river.3 9 As Rockefeller recalled, "We used to
burn it for fuel in distilling the oil, and thousands and hundreds of
thousands of barrels of it floated down the creeks and rivers, and the
ground was saturated with it, in the constant effort to get rid of it."
40
In 1881, Cleveland's mayor considered the Cuyahoga "an open
sewer through the center of the city"' 41 but little was done to address
such concerns. The city's new waterworks and sewer system, con-
structed after cholera outbreaks prior to the Civil War, were higher
priorities than the condition of the river. 42 As Cleveland and the sur-
rounding area industrialized, steel mills, oil refineries, chemical
36. WILLIAM DONOHUE ELLIS, THE CUYAHOGA 1 (1966)(noting
that as the river approaches Cleveland, it becomes "impossible
crooked" and "flows still and deep," features which facilitate the
accumulation of pollution and debris).
37. It is notable that between 1850 and 1860, Cleveland's popula-
tion grew by over 150 percent. See Cuyahoga River Watershed
Nomination Packet, American Heritage River Task Force for the
Cuyahoga River 3 (1997).
38. RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER
78 (1998).
39. Id. at 101. Ironically, the "unusable" portion of crude would
later find great use as gasoline.
40. Id.
41. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLEVELAND HISTORY 338 (David D.
Van Tassel ed., 1996).
42. See Mary B. Stavish, Regionalization of Cleveland's Munici-
pal Services, 1950-1977: The Process and the Politics, at 62-64
(1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity) (on file with Case Western Reserve University library).
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plants, paper mills, and other industrial facilities lined the Cuya-
hoga.43 Even when plant managers sought to limit the dumping of
wastes, oils, and debris into the river, spills were inevitable. City
residents often complained about the foul taste and odor of the local
water supply, though some saw the pollution as an acceptable sign of
progress. As the pollution got worse, the city chose to cope rather
than to clean it up. To find cleaner water supplies the city moved its
water intake cribs further out into Lake Erie, away from the spread-
ing pollution.45 At the same time, the city's sewer system deposited
untreated wastewater directly into Lake Erie, several miles from the
city.
46
43. In the nineteenth century, the shores of the Cuyahoga became
the base of operations for many industrial giants, including Standard
Oil, Sherwin Williams, Republic Steel and Jones & Laughlin Steel,
among others. It also rapidly became the primary shipping port on
the Great Lakes. See Cuyahoga Watershed Nomination Packet, su-
pra note 37, at 6. By 1968, there were twenty-two permitted indus-
trial facilities along the Cuyahoga which discharged their wastewater
into the river. These facilities included thirteen steel mills, six
chemical plants, two paper mills, and a steam electric generating
station. DIVISION OF ENGINEERING, OHIO.DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON WATER QUALITY FOR THE
ROCKY, CUYAHOGA, CHAGRIN AND GRAND RIVERS AND THEIR
TRIBUTARIES 19 (May 1968).
44. ELLIS, supra note 36, at 157.
("The Gilded Age began - and it seemed to run on iron
and oil, which turned the Cuyahoga iron red with an iri-
descent scum of oilbow colors....
"There were some in carriages going over the bridge who
looked down at the red and said it was a shame to dirty
the river that way. But those who were right down in the
waters in boats and barges and scows through the red and
the rainbow were the sweetest colors a river ever had.")
45.JoHN STARK BELLAMY, THE KILLER IN THE ATTIC: AND MORE
TRUE TALES OF CRIME AND DISASTER FROM CLEVELAND'S PAST 176
(2002); Stavish, supra note 42, at 64.
46. Stavish, supra note 42, at 66. Primary sewage treatment was
not instituted until the 1910s, and secondary sewage treatment began
[VOL. XIV
FABLES OF THE CUYAHOGA
The first reported Cuyahoga River fires were well over a century
ago. Indeed it appears that burning oil and debris in rivers was
somewhat common. Due to the volume of oil in the river, the Cuya-
hoga was "so flammable that if steamboat captains shoveled glowing
coals overboard, the water erupted in flames. ' '47 According to one
account, the Cuyahoga caught fire at least three times in the latter
half of the 19th century, in 1868, 1883, and 1887.4  In 1912, a
spark from a passing tugboat ignited oil leaking from the Standard
Oil cargo slip, triggering several explosions and a raging inferno.
The ensuing conflagration killed five men and destroyed several
boats.49 A city ordinance prohibited the release of oil into the river
by refineries, but it appears to have been rarely enforced, and carried
only a $10 fine.5 0 In 1922, another blaze ignited near the same spot
as the 1912 fire, 5 1 and the river flared again in 1930.52
As pollution increased, and refuse and debris accumulated, the risk
of additional fires grew.5 3 A 1936 report in The Cleveland Press
noted the threat of fires sweeping through the industrial areas along-
side the river, but rather than focusing on the reasons the river might
catch fire in the first place, it focused on the lack of adequate fire
control services. 54 Little was done. At one point in 1936 the river
ignited and burned for five days.55 Again in 1941, a patch of oil
in the 1930s, a development that placed Cleveland "in the forefront
of wastewater purification at that time." Id. at 67, 89.
47. CHERNOW, supra note 38, at 101.
48. BELLAMY, supra note 45, at 176-77.
49. Oils in River Menace Lives and Property, CLEVELAND PRESS,
May 1, 1912, at 1.
50. Id.
51. BELLAMY, supra note 45.
52. Fight Oil Fire on Cuyahoga, CLEVELAND PRESS, April 2,
1930, at 1.
53. See Dan Williams, Rivermen Cite Fire Peril, Ask City for Pro-
tection, CLEVELAND PRESS, Mar. 11, 1941, at 1 (noting that city and
federal agencies maintained navigability of Cuyahoga, but did not
limit oil dumping or remove oil from the river).
54. Robert H. Clifford, City's Lake and River Fronts in Constant
Peril of Conflagration Without the Protection of Fire Tugs,
CLEVELAND PRESS, April 25, 1936, at 1.
55. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLEVELAND HISTORY 338 (David D.
Van Tassel ed., 1996).
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scum on the river surface was ignited by ash, causing $7,500 in
damage to an ore carrier.56 Another fire burned on the river in
1948. Throughout, the primary concern over the Cuyahoga was its
suitability for shipping. 58 There was little concern for whether the
water was drinkable or safe for recreational use.
5 9
Over time, the fire hazard became great enough to threaten local
shipping, prompting some local response. 60 After the end of the
Second World War, local businesses and the Port and Harbor Com-
mission began to agitate for river cleanup. Oil-soaked pilings were
seen as a significant threat to boats, port facilities, bridges, and other
local facilities.6 1 In 1948, the local Chamber of Commerce also pro-
posed regular river patrols to find and clean up oil slicks and other
potential hazards. 62 The city's Fire Captain submitted guidelines for
safe gasoline storage along the river, believing the two-dozen or so
industrial facilities along the river would comply.63  In 1950, the
department reported that 46 of 58 fire code violations had been cor-
56. Dan Williams, Rivermen Cite Fire Peril, Ask City for Protec-
tion, CLEVELAND PRESS, Mar. 11, 1941, at 1, 6.
57. Maxwell Riddle, River Trip Bares Oil Waste Peril,
CLEVELAND PRESS, May 6, 1952, at 7.
58. For example, in 1957 the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
claimed the Cuyahoga was in "exceptionally good" shape because
all local docks would be accessible for the shipping season. No
mention was made whether the river was potable or flammable.
Cuyahoga River Seen in Good Condition, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, March 28, 1957, at 19.
59. See id. Cleveland's drinking water was supplied through the
municipal water works, not directly from the Cuyahoga River, and
there was little recreation on the river in and around Cleveland at the
time.
60. Even though water pollution and the occasional fires posed a
threat to the harbor and waterborne commerce, the federal govern-
ment would not utilize its statutory authority to protect rivers and
harbors until the 1960s, and would not bring any actions against
companies along the Cuyahoga until months after the 1969 fire. See
infra Part I.G.
61. Julian Griffin, Fire Hazards Peril Cuyahoga Shipping,
CLEVELAND PRESS, Aug. 11, 1948, at 1.
62. Id. at 14.
63. Id.
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rected, and that all but two companies would be in compliance with
the code shortly.64 "Industry as a whole has been very cooperative
and has made or is making corrections," reported the city's Fire Pre-
vention Chief, William R. Ferrie. 65 Nonetheless, fire officials con-
cluded "the river still presents a serious fire hazard to the commu-
nity" and further measures were required, including interceptors and
skimmers to collect industrial waste and prevent its accumulation on
the river.6
6
In 1952, leaking oil from the Standard Oil Company facility was
accused of creating, "the greatest fire hazard in Cleveland," a two-
inch thick oil slick on the river. 67 In spots, the slick spanned the
width of the river.68 Although many companies had taken action to
limit oil seepage on the river, others failed to cooperate with fire of-
ficials.69 It was only a matter of time before disaster struck. On the
afternoon of November 1, 1952, the Cuyahoga ignited again near the
Great Lakes Towing Company's shipyard, resulting in a five-alarm
fire.70 The next morning's Cleveland Plain Dealer led with a banner
headline, "Oil Slick Fire Ruins Flats Shipyard.",7 1 Photos taken at
the scene are incredible; the river was engulfed in smoke and flame.
Losses were substantial, estimated between $500,000 and $1.5 mil-
lion, including the Jefferson Avenue bridge. 72 The only reason no
one died was that it started on a Saturday afternoon, when few ship-
yard employees were on duty.73
64. Paul Lilley, 2 Tar Firms Hit on Cuyahoga Fire Peril,
CLEVELAND PRESS, Oct. 12, 1950, at 25.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Sohio Blamed for Oil Slick Fire Hazard, CLEVELAND PRESS,
May 1, 1952, at 33.
68. Maxwell Riddle, River Trip Bares Oil Waste Peril,
CLEVELAND PRESS, May 6, 1952, at 7.
69. Id. (noting that "Texaco and Shell docks were perfectly clean"
and the Jones & Laughlin Steel docks were "models of safety" while
others were "dangerously unsafe").
70. Oil Slick Fire Ruins Flats Shipyard; Flames Hit DryDocks,
Three Tugs, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 2, 1952, at 1.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 19.
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Compared to the 1952 inferno, the 1969 fire was nothing special,74
a freak accident that merited little local concern, but sparked national
attention because of increased environmental consciousness
throughout the country.75 That flammable materials were sometimes
dumped into the river was well known, and local officials, with the
help of some (though clearly not all) industry leaders sought to ad-
dress the threat. More responsible firms increased their efforts to
limit accidental spills, and boats were commissioned to skim the
Cuyahoga to remove oil-soaked debris. Such efforts were not enough
to prevent the 1969 fire, but they were a start - and as discussed be-
low, they were only a small portion of the local cleanup efforts that
began before the fire.
The plight of the Cuyahoga River was hardly unique. The fate of
an urban, industrial river from the late 1 9 th century through the
1950s was to be horribly polluted. So long as waterways remained
open, and the channels of commerce clear, a river's condition was
generally considered acceptable. 76 In the 19th century, federal pollu-
tion control efforts were focused upon maintaining the navigability
74. Environmental historian Theodore Steinberg notes that "when
fire broke out yet again on the river on June 22, 1969, no one in
Cleveland was probably all that surprised." THEODORE STEINBERG,
DOWN TO EARTH: NATURE'S ROLE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 238
(2002).
75. Opinion polls conducted in the late 1960s show a dramatic
upswing in public concern about environmental issues generally, and
water pollution in particular. See TERENCE KEHOE, CLEANING UP
THE GREAT LAKES: FROM COOPERATION TO CONFRONTATION 103
(1997). During this same period, several new environmental organi-
zations were launched. See id. at 111; see also JONATHAN H.
ADLER, ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CROSSROADS 23-24 (1995).
Subscriptions to environmental publications also increased dramati-
cally between 1968 and 1970. See Business Bulletin: Pollution Pub-
lication Get a Boost From Rising Worry about the Environment,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1970, at 1.
76. See supra note 58, at 19 (noting U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers' determination that river was in "exceptionally good" condi-
tion because there were no obstructions to navigability).
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of harbors and interstate waterways. 77 The River and Harbors Act of
1899 contained provisions barring the disposal of wastes into navi-
gable waters, but it did not address most liquid wastes, which were
responsible for the lion's share of water pollution.
7 8
As strange as it may sound to some, the Cuyahoga was also not the
only site of river fires. A river leading into the Baltimore harbor
caught flame on June 8, 1926. 7' The Buffalo River in upstate New
York also caught fire in the 1960s.80 The Rouge River in Dearborn,
Michigan "repeatedly caught fire" like the Cuyahoga, 8 1 and a tug-
boat on the Schuylkill burned when oil on the river's surface was
lit.8 2 The tragedy for Cleveland was not simply that oil and debris
caught flame, but that the event transpired as the nation's environ-
mental consciousness was awakening, and searching for symbols of
the burgeoning environmental crisis. A river on fire fit that bill.
C. Cleaning the Cuyahoga
As commonly told, indifferent state and local officials were en-
tirely to blame for the sorry state of the Cuyahoga, and only federal
intervention turned things around. A configration on the river was
"inevitable" due to the lack of stringent federal regulation of water
77. N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation
of Water Quality; Part III: The Federal Effort, 52 IOWA L. REV. 799,
803-04 (1967) [hereinafter Hines III].
78. Id. at 804. In the 1960s, the Rivers and Harbors Act would
eventually be applied to the disposal of some liquid wastes, such as
oil, gasoline, and other flammable materials. See United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
79. River Afire Rolls under Baltimore, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, June 9, 1926, at 1.
80. UPI, Significant Progress on Water Pollution Reported, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 1984, at 31; see also supra note 79.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Ashland Oil & Transport Co., 504
F.2d 1317, 1326 (6th Cir. 1974) (taking judicial notice that the Rouge
and Cuyahoga Rivers had "repeatedly caught fire").
82. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 427 (1958)
(noting tugboat "caught fire when an open-flame kerosene lamp on
the deck of the scow ignited highly flammable vapors lying above an
extensive accumulation of petroleum products spread over the sur-
face of the river").
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pollution. 83 As recounted in one prominent environmental history,
"In 1881, the mayor of Cleveland called the Cuyahoga River 'an
open sewer through the center of the city.' It remained so until pas-
,84sage of the Clean Water Act in 1972."  Yet contrary to popular
perception, Cleveland officials began river cleanup before the 1969
fire.8 T The brief blaze may have prompted federal action to address
water pollution, but local officials and community leaders were well
aware of the Cuyahoga's plight and had already initiated cleanup
efforts, including efforts to remove flammable debris and upgrade
local sewage treatment facilities. "We were already doing the things
we needed to clean up things there, and then the fire happened," re-
calls Ben S. Stefanski II, Utilities Director at the time of the fire.
86
It appears that the nadir of the Cuyahoga was well before the 1969
fire, perhaps around the time of the 1952 inferno. In the days fol-
lowing the November 1952 blaze, local business leaders demanded
action by the city.87 In October 1959, the Cleveland Plain Dealer
trumpeted the reappearance of fish in the Cuyahoga, which suggests
there had been noticeable improvement in at least some aspects of
river quality, but more action was still needed.88 In 1962, the Cleve-
land Press reported that the river was "choked with debris" and
"filthier than ever." 89 The main channel leading to the port was kept
clear by the Port Commission, but little else was being done to keep
the river clear and safe, causing some local government and business
83. Oliver A. Houck, The Water, The Trees and the Land Three
Nearly Forgotten Cases that Changed the American Landscape, 70
TUL. L. REV. 2279, 2286 (1996).
84. PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 39 (1993).
85. Yet, as discussed infra notes 113-114, 132-171 and accompa-
nying text, Ohio's state officials were slower to act.
86. Roger Brown, 1969 River Blaze Scarred Image, CLEVELAND
PLAIN DEALER, June 18, 1969, at 1-B.
87. See Demands Burke End Oil Fire Hazard on Cuyahoga River,
CLEVELAND PRESS, Nov. 3, 1952, at 6.
88. Sanford Watzman, It's True! Fish Come Back to 01' Cuya-
hoga, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 23, 1959, at 1. It is quite
remarkable, in itself, that the presence of fish in the Cuyahoga river
would be considered worthy of front page treatment.
89. Harry McClelland, Scum, Debris Make River a Fire Hazard,
CLEVELAND PRESS, Mar. 13, 1962, at 1.
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leaders to respond. By 1963, the primary industrial and municipal
users of the river had formed the Cuyahoga River Basin Water Qual-
ity Committee, which began conducting water quality surveillance
programs. 90 Shortly thereafter, the city also hired a private scaven-
ger vessel to remove debris in the river.
91
Despite these efforts, and whatever progress they produced, a fed-
eral report issued in October 1968 identified the Cuyahoga as one of
the most heavily polluted rivers in the nation. 92 Another report noted
the "gross pollution" of the river, consisting of "oil and debris, inor-
ganic compounds from chemical- and steel-mill wastes, and exces-
sive nutrients from untreated domestic sewage." 93 The Cuyahoga
was clearly "the most polluted water in the Erie basin," and was the
second greatest contributor to Lake Erie pollution. 94 As one federal
official described the situation, "[t]he lower Cuyahoga River and
navigation channel throughout the Cleveland area is a waste treat-
ment lagoon. At times, the river is choked with debris, oils, scums,
and floating globs of organic sludges."
95
While the plight of the Cuyahoga River, as well as Lake Erie, had
yet to become national issues, they prompted public local concern.
96
Local activists, such as David Blaushild, and joumalists, such as the
Cleveland Plain Dealer's Robert Drake, urged immediate action on
90. See FRANK A. BUTRICO, ET AL., RECOMMENDED PROJECTS FOR
POLLUTION ABATEMENT ON THE LOWER CUYAHOGA RIVER TO THE
OHIO WATER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY 7 (Battelle Memorial Insti-
tute, December 20, 1968).
91. See id at 13; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION &
WELFARE, CONFERENCE IN THE MATTER OF POLLUTION OF LAKE
ERIE AND ITS TRIBUTARIES, PROCEEDINGS Vol. 4, 837-38 (Aug.
1965) (statement of Mayor Locher noting that the city was opening
bids for a contract to remove debris from the river).
92. Cuyahoga River Put Among the Most Rank, CLEVELAND
PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 3, 1968, at 10.
93. See BUTRICO, ET AL., supra note 90, at 1.
94. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Wastes, Water and Wishful Thinking:
The Battle of Lake Erie, 20 CASE WESTERN REs. L. REV. 5, 8-10
(1968)(Cleveland contributed nine percent of the municipal waste-
load entering Lake Erie; Detroit contributed 64.4 percent).
95. Id. at 7 (quoting George Harlow, Director, Lake Erie Program
Office, Federal Water Pollution Control Administration).
96. KEHOE, supra note 75, at 53.
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pollution matters.97 In 1965, Ohio's governor requested that the fed-
eral government hold a conference on Lake Erie pollution under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act.9 8 At the conference, Blaushild
delivered over 200,000 letters and petition signatures he gathered
through his car dealership calling for greater enforcement of existing
pollution control laws.99 Blaushild and other local activists were
driven by a "strong sense of place" and desire to protect those areas
with which "they were familiar because of residential proximity or
frequent recreational use." 100 Blaushild would later orchestrate liti-
gation efforts to prompt river cleanup.10'
By 1968, Cleveland leaders apparently agreed on the need to ad-
dress water pollution in the Cuyahoga. 102 As city residents moved
to the suburbs and industrial activity ebbed, local government offi-
cials and business leaders sought to stem the city's decline.10 3 Carl
Stokes, elected Mayor in 1967, pledged a greater commitment to
pollution concerns than his predecessor. 0 4 In November 1968, vot-
ers approved a $100 million bond issue to finance river cleanup and
protection. 10 5  The measure passed by a two-to-one margin. 1 6
97. See, e.g., id. at 44, 55.
98. Reitze, supra note 94, at 50-1.
99. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE,
CONFERENCE IN THE MATTER OF POLLUTION OF LAKE ERIE AND ITS
TRIBUTARIES, PROCEEDINGS Vol. 4, 1068-70 (Aug. 1965). See also
KEHOE, supra note 75, at 71. Blaushild even went so far as to take
out full-page ads in the Cleveland Plain Dealer. Id. (picture insert).
100. KEHOE, supra note 75, at 53.
101. See infra Part I.F.
102. Cleveland's initiative was not singular. As William Hines
reported in 1966, "in most states community awareness of the wors-
ening condition of the waters has eventually generated sufficient
pressure to require more effective pollution controls." N. William
Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality;
Part L State Pollution Control Programs, 52 IOWA L. REv. 186, 201
(1966).
103. See generally, Business Now Backs Cleveland,
BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 21, 1968, at 118.
104. Stavish, supra note 42, at 127-28.
105. Prior to the bond issue, it could be said that "[tihe failure to
provide adequate municipal sewage treatment is almost entirely due
to a lack of community interest in abating its harmful waste dis-
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Among the projects financed by the bond issue were sewer system
improvements, stormwater overflow controls, harbor improvement
facilities, and an improved debris removal program. 1° 7 City officials
welcomed the vote, calling it a "mandate" for the city to clean up the
river, as well as an opportunity "to ask for strict enforcement of state
and federal anti-pollution laws."'10 8  They also sought to convince
state officials to locate a state water pollution control office in
Cleveland at city expense. State cooperation was possible as the
legislature had created the Ohio Water Development Authority sev-
eral months earlier, and the governor requested that the new agency
devote "specific attention" to pollution abatement projects in the
Lower Cuyahoga River Basin. 1°9 In early 1969, city leaders agreed
to finance a program to remove oil and debris from the river. In
June, the newly created Clean Water Task Force began researching
new methods for removing oil pollution from the Cuyahoga with
some federal financial support. 1' One official even proposed using
the money to reverse the flow of the Cuyahoga, so as to stem pollu-
tion around Cleveland and in Lake Erie, although an earlier proposal
along the same lines had been rejected by federal officials. 112
charges, for there are no technological problems" preventing sewage
treatment. Reitze, supra note 94, at 9.
106. Voters Win Round 1 of War on Pollution, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Nov. 7, 1968, at 9.
107. See generally, George R. Watkins, Lake Erie Ain't
Dead.. .But It Needs Help on Nov. 5, CLEVELANDER, Oct. 1968, at
50-51.
108. Betty Klaric, Passage of Clean Water Issue Is Called a Chal-
lenge to City, CLEVELAND PRESS, Nov. 6, 1968, at A13; Voters Win
Round 1 of War on Pollution, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 7,
1968, at 9. It is also worth noting that voters in Michigan also ap-
proved a bond issue to finance pollution control for Lake Erie. See
The People vs. Pollution, CLEVELAND PRESS, Nov. 8, 1968, at A8.
109. See BUTRICO, ET AL., supra note 90, at 3-4.
110. Bill is Due on Cleanup of Cuyahoga River, CLEVELAND
PRESS, Mar. 25, 1969, at D-14.
111. Department of Public Utilities City of Cleveland, Press Re-
lease, June 13, 1969.
112. William C. Barnard, Reverse Cuyahoga, Pollution Chief
Urges, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 25, 1969, at 9-A.
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The bond issue was important, but it was not a panacea. The city
delayed issuance of the bonds due to unfavorable interest rates and
the lack of matching funds from the state and federal govern-
ments.113 The state had apparently expected to provide funding for
pollution control projects, yet balked when federal support was not
forthcoming.114 Congress authorized substantial sums for Lake Erie
cleanup, but then failed to actually appropriate the money. 1 5 Cleve-
land spent approximately $30 million on the construction of waste
treatment facilities from 1967 to 1970.1 16 During this period, the
state provided less than $1 million in assistance, and the federal gov-
ernment allocated "not one dime" to help clean up the Cuyahoga.,
17
The lack of state and federal support for Cleveland's efforts was
nothing new. Mayor Stokes' predecessor, Ralph Locher, also com-
plained that Ohio's cities received no financial support from the state
for pollution control efforts." 8 Indeed, throughout the 1960s, federal
expenditures for pollution control were quite minor, particularly in
comparison to the $100 million approved by Cleveland's voters.
The developments in Cleveland appear to have been part of a lar-
ger trend. The Ohio legislature enacted legislation to control water
pollution in 1951. Among other things, this law created a state water
pollution control board and prohibited the discharge of harmful sub-
statices into state waters absent a valid permit from the state board.
William Hines reported in 1966 that "in the majority of states inter-
est in controlling pollution has come alive in the last fifteen
113. Adele Z. Silver, Antipollution Efforts Deceiving, CLEVELAND
PLAIN DEALER, July 10, 1969, at 15-A.
114. See Letter from James A. Rhodes, Governor, State of Ohio, to
Ben S. Stefanski, Director, Department of Public Utilities (Dec. 4,
1968)(on file with Western Reserve Historical Society in Cleveland,
Ohio).
115. Antipollution Efforts Deceiving, supra note 113. The practice
of authorizing substantial sums for pollution control but then failing
to appropriate the authorized funds would become a pattern the city
would repeatedly face.
116. Stokes Testimony, supra note 5, at 413.
117. Id.
118. See Reitze, supra note 94, at 79. It is also a fair criticism that
Ralph Locher was less concerned about river cleanup than would be
his successor, Carl Stokes.
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years.""119 A 1972 General Accounting Office study further noted
that state programs improved substantially in the late 1960s., 20 Fed-
eral legislation encouraged greater state efforts, but only to a limited
extent.12 1 'In most cases it has been local public indignation over
the filth of local waters that has breathed life into the state control
effort," Hines concluded. 122 By 1966, every state had enacted water
pollution legislation of some sort delegating responsibility to one or
more state agencies. 23  Hines found that some states' regulatory
programs were more comprehensive than others, but observed that
this could largely be the result of differences in state experiences and
levels of industrialization. 124 As would be expected, different states
made different decisions about regulatory structure and priorities.
Many states did not enforce particularly rigorous standards, and en-
forcement was inconsistent. 125 Much the same could be said of fed-
eral efforts to enforce then-existing federal regulations, including the
provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 and the 1965 Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act.
Although reliable data on water quality in the 1960s is hard to
come by, there is reason to believe that state and local efforts pro-
duced measurable, if modest, improvement in water quality in many
areas. A. Myrick Freeman of Resources for the Future notes that
pre-1972 state efforts were "apparently somewhat successful" at
controlling water pollution: "The results of the EPA's first National
Water Quality Inventory, conducted in 1973, indicated there had
been significant improvements in most major waterways over the
preceding decade, at least in regard to organic wastes and bacte-
119. N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation
of Water Quality; Part I: State Pollution Control Programs, 52
IOWA L. REv. 186, 234 (1966) [hereinafter Hines I].
120. U.S. General Accounting Office, Water Pollution Abatement
Program: Assessment of Federal and State Enforcement Efforts, B-
166506 (Mar. 23, 1972), at 8. The GAO study was based on a re-
view of six state programs. Id. at 5-6.
121. Hines I, supra note 119, at 234 (noting federal encouragement
"is probably not as important as is often suggested").
122. Id. at234.
123. Id. at 215.
124. Id. at 216.
125. Id. at 224, 227.
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ria."' 126 This does not mean that additional efforts, including greater
federal intervention, were unnecessary, but it does temper the gen-
eral perception that state and local governments were total laggards
in pollution control.
While local efforts may have been sufficient to provide some level
of protection for the Cuyahoga, Lake Erie suffered the fate of any
common pool resource. Absent federal involvement, any jurisdic-
tion abutting the lake that sought to curtail its pollution could have
no guarantee that other jurisdictions would take the same action.
The fact contributed to the call for federal involvement, even if only
to prevent states from imposing their pollution upon other jurisdic-
tions. 127 Interestingly enough, most lake pollution came from mu-
nicipalities in the region, and Cleveland was among the first to un-
dertake efforts to clean up its act.
1 28
Cleveland made significant strides toward environmental im-
provement in 1968 and 1969. In addition to the bond issue and the
creation of the Clean Water Task Force - both before the June 1969
fire - the city enacted "one of the strongest air pollution codes in the
country." 129 Yet while pollution remained a prominent item on the
126. A. Myrick Freeman, Water Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC
POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 114 (Paul Portney ed.,
1990).
127. The control of interstate pollution, a jurisdictional "spillover"
problem, is perhaps the most powerful justification for federal envi-
ronmental regulation. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules
for Transboundary Pollution, 44 DUKE L.J. 931, 932 (1997) ("Given
the inherent difficulties in regulation by any single state, transbound-
ary pollution would seem to present a clear case for shifting regula-
tory authority from local to more centralized levels of governance.").
For a greater discussion of the justification for federal environmental
regulation to curb such interstate spillover problems, see Jonathan H.
Adler, Let 50 Flowers Bloom: Transforming the States Into Labora-
tories of Environmental Policy, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11284, 11298-
300 (2001); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environ-
mental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2341 (1996).
128. Reitze, supra note 94, at 81.
129. Letter from Mayor Carl B. Stokes, Mayor, City of Cleveland,
to Stephen Romine, Professor, University of Colorado (October 26,
1970)(on file with Western Reserve Historical Society in Cleveland,
Ohio).
[VOL. XIV
FABLES OF THE CUYAHOGA
city's agenda, Mayor Stokes forthrightly declared that, as Mayor, he
"face[d] many more serious crises which affect the lives of my con-
stituents to a greater degree than air and water pollution.... These
include housing, jobs, food, clothing and the ability to live in a soci-
ety free of racial hatred."' 130 Mayor Stokes expressed his "hope that
the amount of concern over the environmental crisis will not over-
shadow these more basic and in many ways more difficult social
problems."'
3 1
None of this suggests that the city was blameless in the June 1969
fire. Although some of the local efforts, such as the bond initiative,
were impressive, additional measures were possible, including more
diligent efforts to prevent the accumulation of oil and debris in the
river. Improving sewage treatment along the river was a significant
step, but it would do little by itself to reduce the fire hazard. A rea-
sonable question to ask is that if the city was so concerned about the
state of the Cuyahoga, why did it not do more to address the prob-
lem, particularly the aspects of the problem which contributed to the
various fires? If local citizens were so upset why were they not
more aggressive at using existing legal measures to combat pollu-
tion? In particular, why were there not more efforts to use common
law doctrines of private and public nuisance to address pollution
concerns? It is to these questions that the article now turns.
D. City and State
In the wake of the June 1969 fire, many city officials pointed fin-
gers at the state of Ohio for creating a legal regime which made it
unduly difficult for the city to maintain local river quality. Specifi-
cally, officials pointed to the state water pollution permitting system
which insulated permitted facilities from public nuisance actions and
generally inhibited local efforts to combat pollution. Had the state
been more aggressive and cooperative, local officials suggested, the
Cuyahoga would have been in much better shape. State officials, for
their part, accused the city of insufficient local efforts.
130. Letter from Carl B. Stokes, Mayor, City of Cleveland, to Ber-
nard N. Sroka (August 12, 1970)(on file with Western Reserve His-
torical Society in Cleveland, Ohio).
131. Id.
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Just after the June 1969 fire, Mayor Stokes announced he would
petition the state for relief from upstream pollution sources.
132
"We'll file the lawsuit on behalf of all the citizens of Cleveland and
let the courts decide," Stokes declared. 33 While there are no news
accounts suggesting an actual lawsuit was filed, Mayor Stokes wrote
to Ohio Governor James Rhodes complaining that Cleveland had
"been unable to contain" water pollution on the Cuyahoga "because
the City of Cleveland has no jurisdiction over the river."'1 34 Stokes
alleged that "[tihe State has capriciously been circumventing the
laws of Ohio by issuing licenses to polluters and making no effort to
prevent the kind of occurrences" that led to the fire.' 35 Despite prior
requests from Cleveland to the state, "nothing ha[d] been done" to
enforce water pollution controls on the Cuyahoga, Stokes charged.'
3 6
Stokes also wrote to the Director of the Ohio Natural Resources De-
partment, inquiring about the lack of enforcement of Ohio's anti-
litter law on the Cuyahoga.'
37
State officials responded to Mayor Stokes' complaint by citing the
city's sewer system as a major source of oil in the river, and threat-
ened enforcement actions against the city. 38 According to the letter,
the city's "storm sewers contain oily wastes washed into them from
automobile drippings on the streets and in filling stations. The sani-
132. Betty Klaric, Stokes Promises to Lead Pollution Fight,
CLEVELAND PRESS, June 24, 1969, at D3.
133. Id.
134. Letter from Carl B. Stokes, Mayor, City of Cleveland, to
James A. Rhodes, Governor, State of Ohio (June 24, 1969)(on file
with Western Reserve Historical Society in Cleveland, Ohio). As
noted infra notes 193-196 and accompanying text, state water pollu-
tion permits shielded polluting facilities from public nuisance ac-
tions.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Letter from Carl B. Stokes, Mayor, City of Cleveland, to Fred
E. Morr, Director, Ohio Natural Resources Department (June 24,
1969)(on file with Western Reserve Historical Society in Cleveland,
Ohio).
138. Oil in River is Blamed on City, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER,
July 4, 1969, at 1. State officials had long been more concerned
about pollution from municipal sewage systems than with industrial
pollution.
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tary sewers have oily wastes and the discharge from homes, busi-
nesses and industries."' 39  Several Cleveland companies and
neighboring suburbs were also implicated in the state's response. 140
The state also threatened to sanction the city and local businesses by
freezing new building within the city, banning industrial expansion
without adequate waste treatment, and direct legal action to close
non-complying facilities.' 4' In regard to Ohio's anti-litter law, the
state's response was equally direct, if less punitive. Deputy Director
of the Department of Natural Resources S.L. Frost wrote Mayor
Stokes that enforcement of the anti-litter law was the obligation of
all municipal police forces under state law, and that it was Stokes'
responsibility, as Mayor, "to ensure performance of that duty.' 42
In Cleveland's defense, local officials claimed that the fire had
been caused by "highly volatile materials," rather than the sort of oil
found in the city sewers. 143 The sort of oil typically discharged from
boats or flowing from city sewers was generally "low grade" and
"non-inflammable in the water.' 144 City treatment plants complied
with state requirements, city officials claimed, and a planned up-
grade of local sewer facilities had been delayed by the lack of state
or federal matching funds. 145 Local officials agreed with those from
the state that several local industrial facilities were significant con-
tributors to Cuyahoga water pollution. Yet, this was something that
only state officials could do something about, as these facilities held
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Betty Klaric, Cleveland Is Threatened with Freeze on Build-
ing, CLEVELAND PRESS, July 4, 1969, at 1.
142. Letter from S.L. Frost, Deputy Director, Department of Natu-
ral Resources, to Carl B. Stokes, Mayor, City of Cleveland (July 7,
1969).
143. Letter from Dr. Edward J. Martin, Director, Clean Water Task
Force, to James A. Rhodes, Governor, State of Ohio (July 7, 1969);
City Water Expert Disputes State Official Over River Fire,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, July 8, 1969, at 12-A.
144. City Investigating Cause of River Fire, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, June 24, 1969, at 4-D.
145. Letter from Dr. Edward J. Martin, Director, Clean Water Task
Force, to James A. Rhodes, Governor, State of Ohio (July 7, 1969);
City Water Expert Disputes State Official Over River Fire,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, July 8, 1969, at 12-A.
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state-issued permits. Writing to Ohio Governor Rhodes on July 7,
1969, Clean Water Task Force Director Edward J. Martin noted that:
All of the industries mentioned in your letter are under
State Ohio Water Pollution Control Board permit [sic] to
discharge wastes. The City of Cleveland has no further
jurisdiction over these discharges since the State has as-
sumed primary responsibility for enforcement in the
Cuyahoga River. 1
46
The state's water pollution control board licensed industrial facilities
along the river, providing potential immunity from suit. "We have
no jurisdiction over what is dumped" in the river, explained Utilities
Director Ben. S. Stefanski II. "The state licenses the industries and
gives them legal authority to dump in the river. Actually, the state
gives them a license to pollute."'14 7 Among the only times the city
could take direct action against an industrial polluter was when a
facility illegally discharged wastes directly into the city sewer sys-
tem.148 Such concerns had also been raised prior to the June 1969
fire. In December 1968, then-State Representative George Voino-
vich urged Ohio Governor James Rhodes to "get tough" on indus-
trial polluters. 149 Ohio had "one of the best pollution controls laws
in the United States," Voinovich charged, but it was not enforced.150
Although state law authorized regulatory controls on polluting ac-
tivity, such controls were rarely imposed with any stringency. Small
businesses complained that state enforcement efforts tended to focus
on minor actors, while large industrial firms could pollute with im-
punity. 151 Mayor Stokes was even more critical, testifying before
Congress that the state "issues water discharge permits at such a low
level that industries and municipalities can virtually dump what
amounts almost to pure garbage and only minimally treated effluents
146. Letter from Dr. Edward J. Martin, Director, Clean Water Task
Force, to James A. Rhodes, Governor, State of Ohio (July 7, 1969).
147. City Investigating Cause of River Fire, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, June 24, 1969, at 4-D.
148. See, e.g., Betty Klaric, City Sues Railroad in Oil Spill,
CLEVELAND PRESS, Sept. 10, 1969, at All (noting city lawsuit
against railroad for discharging 52,526 gallons of oil into sewers).
149. Stricter Pollution Policy Is Urged, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Dec. 14, 1968, at 7.
150. Id.
151. KEHOE, supra note 75, at 109.
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into the streams, the rivers, and the tributaries that lead into the
lake."' 152 In theory, the permit system was designed to enable indus-
trial firms to develop and implement cost-effective pollution con-
trols. 153 In practice, it appears that once permits were issued, indus-
trial firms were able to pollute with impunity.' 
54
State officials acknowledged at the time that they adopted a rela-
tively hands off approach to enforcement of permit conditions. As
Dr. Emmett Arnold, chairman of the Ohio Water Pollution Control
Board, told the Cleveland Plain Dealer several days after the fire, he
was unaware of the board ever taking "legal action - a fine or revok-
ing of a permit" for pollution violations. 155 "We can usually get
these industries to be good boys," he explained 156 - but apparently
not good enough.
State water quality regulations were adopted in 1966 and amended
in 1967. 157 Regulations contained seven water quality criteria cate-
gories to be used for classifying Ohio waters: public water supply;
industrial water supply, aquatic life A, aquatic life B, recreation, ag-
ricultural use and stock watering, and cold water fisheries. 158  In
theory, all Ohio waters were also to meet minimum standards, in-
cluding being "free from floating debris, oil, scum and other floating
materials" and "free from materials ...producing color, odor or
other conditions in such degree as to create a nuisance." But this
was not always the case, as evidenced by the condition of the Cuya-
hoga at the time. In the early 1960s, "the Ohio Water Pollution Con-
trol Board still subscribed to the idea that the use of a stream for
waste disposal was legitimate, so long as it did not interfere with
other accepted uses."159 In practice, Ohio's system of water zoning
152. Stokes Testimony, supra note 5, at 413.
153. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE,
CONFERENCE IN THE MATTER OF POLLUTION OF LAKE ERIE AND ITS
TRIBUTARIES, PROCEEDINGS vol. 1, 48 (Aug. 1965) (statement of
Congressman Charles A. Vanik).
154. Id.
155. State Engineers Prowl River for Fire Source, CLEVELAND
PLAIN DEALER, June 25, 1969, at 9-A.
156. Id.
157. Reitze, supra note 94, at 81.
158. Id. at 52.
159. KEHOE, supra note 75, at 35.
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"legitimize[d] continued pollution of our waterways by industry."'1 60
The harbor area around Cleveland was zoned as an industrial water
supply. 161 The industrial water supply standard was such that water
classified for industrial use was unusable for any other purpose, as
the condition of the Cuyahoga amply demonstrated. 162 The aquatic
life B standard was not much better as, despite its name, water meet-
ing that standard could not support much aquatic life.
The actions of the state government "demonstrated that it is possi-
ble to approach the point of doing nothing to solve the problem
while creating an atmosphere of action." 163 Ohio had various pro-
grams, yet it preempted local efforts and common law remedies
while failing to devote resources in water pollution control. As of
1967, Cleveland had received no state support for pollution control
efforts, and was itself spending over $1 million per year. 164 Despite
federal pressure to begin cleaning up Lake Erie, the state refused to
enforce cleanup deadlines on most jurisdictions.1 65 Historically,
Ohio residents were unwilling to pay the cost to control their own
pollution, particularly that which results from untreated sewage. 1
66
Until the late 1960s, most Ohioans had other priorities. Nonetheless,
it would be wrong to think that Ohio was alone. Other states in the
region were no more aggressive in addressing water pollution.1 67
Under both federal and local pressure, the state did eventually be-
come more active in enforcement of its legal provisions. In April
1970, the Ohio Water Pollution Control Board followed through
with its threat and imposed a freeze on building in Cleveland and 33
suburbs until Cleveland developed detailed plans for the construction
and upgrade of regional sewers and interceptor systems.1 68 The re-
160. Reitze, supra note 94, at 54.
161. Id. at 53.
162. Id. at 54.
163. Id. at77.
164. Id. at79.
165. See Betty Klaric, Pollution Cleanup Delay Hit by U.S. in Lake
Erie Report, CLEVELAND PRESS, June 26, 1969, at A4.
166. See Reitze, supra note 94, at 76.
167. Id. at 78-9, 81.
168. Betty Klaric, Building Ban Here Reflects U.S. Environmental
Furor, CLEVELAND PRESS, April, 16, 1970, at F4; Alan Horton, City
Awaits Formal Building Ban, CLEVELAND PRESS, April 16, 1970, at
F4.
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sponse from Cleveland officials was less than favorable. "The state
wants us to build now what was proposed in 1966 and what we think
is totally inadequate today," said city Utilities Director Ben Stefanski
II. 169 Nonetheless, Stefanski urged the Mayor to take the necessary
steps to lift the ban.17
0
The conflict between city and state officials doubtlessly compli-
cated cleanup efforts in the late 1960s. As might be expected, politi-
cal officials were at least as interested in assigning
(or avoiding) blame for the June 1969 fire as they were actually ad-
dressing pollution concerns. City officials were obviously more
aware of the costs imposed by the foul state of the Cuyahoga River,
and were sensitive to the outrage building in their community.
While the state seems to have been indifferent, if not hostile, to local
concerns about industrial pollution at the outset - at least in and
around Cleveland' 7 1 - it eventually became more responsive to the
city's concerns as environmental protection became a more salient
political concern. In the fall of 1972, shortly before passage of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the state created the Ohio En-
vironmental Protection Agency, thereby unifying the state's various
environmental protection programs. With the creation of the Ohio
EPA, the state also became more aggressive in addressing environ-
mental concerns. This development suggests that Cleveland and
Columbus were on their way to resolve their conflicts and cooperate
on pollution control efforts before the federal government inter-
vened.
E. Failing the Common Law
Another culprit traditionally blamed for the poor state of environ-
mental quality prior to the enactment of federal environmental law is
the common law. In particular, commentators note that common law
169. Alan Horton, City Awaits Formal Building Ban, CLEVELAND
PLAIN DEALER, April 16, 1970, at F4.
170. Letter from Ben S. Stefanski II, Director, Department of Pub-
lic Utilities, City of Cleveland, to Carl B. Stokes, Mayor, City of
Cleveland (April 16, 1970).
171. Cleaning up the Cuyahoga around Cleveland was a relatively
low environmental priority for the state. See Stokes Testimony, su-
pra note 5, at 413 (noting the state ranked Cleveland 25 th on the pri-
ority list for receipt of federal pollution control funds).
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causes of action, such as nuisance and trespass, were unable to rem-
edy, let alone prevent, industrial pollution to any great extent. As
explained in a top-selling environmental law casebook, "one of the
motivations for legislation in the area of environmental degradation
has been a dissatisfaction with the capacity of the common law to
mediate between individual property rights and emerging environ-
mental harm in a manner that adequately respects modem concerns
about environmental quality." 172 Another commentator observes
"the common law era saw some of the most dramatic pollution epi-
sodes. It was during this time that the Cuyahoga River caught
fire."' 173 This view is certainly understandable. In his seminal his-
tory of water pollution control efforts, Hines noted in 1966 that in
many jurisdictions, "it ha[d] not been very long since . . .private
remedies in law and equity were the mainstays of the local pollution
control program."' 174 Yet despite the existence of such remedies,
water pollution accumulated and some rivers, including the Cuya-
hoga, eventually burned.
There is no doubt that the common law faced - and still faces -
substantial limitations in its ability to address pollution concerns.
17 5
Yet it is also likely that the common law may have gotten something
of a bum rap. The history of the Cuyahoga River suggests that the
inherent limitations of the common law were exacerbated by gov-
ernment policy. Specifically, there is reason to believe that common
law actions, in particular municipal actions to abate public nui-
172. ROBERT PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 1018 (2d ed. 1996).
173. Frank B. Cross, Common Law Conceits: A Comment on
Meiners & Yandle, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 965, 977 (1999).
174. Hines I, supra note 119, at 196. See also, Roger Meiners &
Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environ-
mental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923 (1999); Cf Rights and
Remedies in the Law of Stream Pollution, 35 VA. L. REV. 774
(1949).
175. Of course, much the same can be said of most, if not all, regu-
latory programs that have been implemented in place of the common
law. As one recent review of federal environmental policy con-
cluded, "For all its accomplishments, we conclude that the pollution
control regulatory system is deeply and fundamentally flawed." J.
CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, REGULATING POLLUTION 2
(1997).
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sances, could have played a more substantial role in curtailing pollu-
tion along the Cuyahoga. The Cuyahoga experience sheds light on
the nature of the common law's limitations, just as it may help illu-
minate the strengths and weaknesses of other pollution control
strategies and how they were adopted.
While private nuisance actions appear to have been reasonably ef-
fective at providing relief from acute pollution problems causing
identifiable harms to specific landowners, they were not well suited
to address more diffuse pollution problems. Where there were nu-
merous contributors to the pollution it was more difficult to identify
culpable defendants. On the Cuyahoga it could have been particu-
larly difficult to identify which industrial facilities were responsible
for flammable debris and oil or the material implicated in a specific
fire. Similarly, some pollution problems did not satisfy the tradi-
tional requirements of private nuisance actions, particularly the iden-
tification of concrete and particularized harms suffered by the plain-
tiff but not by the public at large. There may not have been many
private landowners along the river who could have claimed the sort
of specific harm to the use and enjoyment of their property required
to bring a private nuisance action (although the owners of the rail-
road bridges harmed in the 1969 fire would undoubtedly had suffi-
cient basis for a cause of action had a definitive source of the flam-
mable material been identified). The Cuyahoga's pollution had a
broad effect on most of the river's users. For these reasons, William
Hines concluded that "[p]rivate remedies available to persons suffer-
ing injury as a result of unreasonable water use have not proved ef-
fective in protecting the public interest."'
' 76
176. Hines I, supra note 119, at 195. For other critiques of the use
of common law to prevent pollution, see Christopher H. Schroeder,
Lost in the Translation: What Environmental Regulation Does that
Tort Cannot Duplicate, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 583, 586 (2002); see also
Cross, supra note 173; Andrew Mcfee Thompson, Free Market En-
vironmentalism and the Common Law: Confusion, Nostalgia, and
Inconsistency, 45 EMORY L. J. 1329 (1996); andPeter S. Menell, The
Limitations of Legal Institutions for Addressing Environmental
Risks, J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (1991). But see Keith N. Hylton, When
Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental Regulation, 41
WASHBURN L.J. 515 (2002); see also THE COMMON LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MODERN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morris eds.,
2002]
122 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
Hines identified two problems with private causes of action. First,
"actions based on pollution are not easy to win." 177 Potential plain-
tiffs face numerous obstacles, from standing and the evidentiary bur-
den to affirmative defenses and judicial reluctance to provide injunc-
tive relief. Over time, juries may become more sympathetic to nui-
sance claims brought against corporate polluters, but in many juris-
dictions this would not produce rapid environmental progress. Hines
was also concerned that "courts are generally not well suited to per-
form the functions required for effective pollution control.' 7 8 "A
control agency specializing in water quality problems and endowed
with authority differently in kind and degree from that exercised by
the courts seems essential to cope effectively with water pollu-
tion." 
179
It should be noted that the viability of nuisance claims varied to
some extent from state to state. Indeed, private nuisance actions
may have been more viable in Ohio than in some other jurisdictions
at the time. Ohio courts rarely considered the reasonableness of ac-
tivities giving rise to nuisance claims and Ohio courts were generally
hostile to claims that polluters could acquire prescriptive rights if
they had continually polluted for a sufficient amount of time before a
suit was filed.18 0 It appears courts may have been more receptive to
2000); and Meiners & Yandle, supra note 174; Todd J. Zywicki, A
Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common Law: An
Institutional Comparison of Common Law and Legislative Solutions
to Large Number Externality Problems, 46 CASE W. RES. L. Rev.
961, 1009 (1996).
177. Hines I, supra note 119, at 197.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 201.
180. See Survey of Ohio Law - 1955, WESTERN RESERVE L. REV.
317-19 (June 1956). One notable exception to this rule is when the
plaintiff also used the river for its own pollution discharge. See
Cleveland v. Standard Bag & Paper Co., 74 N.E. 206 (Ohio 1905).
Although the Standard Bag case seems to support the argument that
prescriptive easements for pollution may be obtained, at least by a
public entity, the Court also repeatedly noted that the plaintiff was a
paper mill, "whose contributions to the pollution of the stream would
render it unfit for primary or domestic purposes." Id. at 209. Cf
Peyton v. Hammer, 269 N.E. 2d 136, 138 (Ohio Com. P1. 1970)
(noting insofar as Standard Bag stood for polluter's ability to obtain
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"coming to the nuisance" arguments, however. In 1928, for exam-
ple, a state court agreed to dismiss a private nuisance claim against
an industrial rayon plant that had been sited before the development
of nearby residential neighborhoods.' 
8
Through the 1950s, Ohio courts generally applied traditional nui-
sance standards in water pollution cases, finding dischargers liable
where the evidence showed a) an injury to the plaintiff due to sub-
stantial water contamination; b) the contamination resulted from a
deliberate discharge; and c) the contamination was reasonably fore-
seeable.182 As reported in a treatise in 1957, in cases "involving se-
rious pollution by reason of the discharge of sewage or industrial
wastes into a stream, the Ohio courts have shown no tendency to
inquire into the reasonableness of the defendant's activity."',
83
Private nuisance suits to induce local firms to reduce pollution
were considered, yet few were tried. In 1968, for example, a local
environmental group called Citizens for Clean Air and Water
(CCAW) approved litigation against two facilities owned by Ford
Motor Company and Republic Steel. 184 Although CCAW received a
commitment of legal assistance from the Legal Aid Society, it ap-
prescriptive rights, it was no longer the law of Ohio prior to enact-
ment of Ohio's 1951 Water Pollution Control Act). This clean
hands requirement would likely have made it difficult for local in-
dustries to file nuisance claims against their neighbors. For a discus-
sion of the prescription issue in other states, see Hines I, supra note
119, at 198.
181. Industrial Fibre Co. v. State, 166 N.E. 418 (Ohio Ct. App.
1928). That the argument adopted by the court could readily be used
to defend oil refineries and other industrial facilities was immedi-
ately noted by the business press. See W.C. Platt, Business Pro-
tected from Encroachment of Residences, NAT'L PETROLEUM NEWS,
Mar. 21, 1928, at 30.
182. See CHARLES C. CALLAHAN, PRINCIPLES OF WATER RIGHTS
LAW IN OHIO § 35 (1957).
183. Id. The Callahan treatise does note one 1952 case in which
reasonableness was a factor. Id. (citing Ratcliffe v. Indian Hill
Acres, 113 N.E. 2d 30 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952).
184. Betty Klaric, Citizens May Sue Polluters, CLEVELAND PRESS,
Dec. 3, 1968, at A4; Robert G. McGruder, Pollution Foes Hit Ford
Republic, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 4, 1968, at 9-D.
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pears the actions were never pursued. 185  One major problem for
potential litigants was the difficulty in proving that the injury alleged
was caused by the defendant's polluting activity.' 86 Identifying con-
tributors to local pollution problems should have been feasible. In
1968 a federal report identified specific facilities as the source of
specific amounts of pollution in Lake Erie. 187 This suggests that at
least some specific polluters could have been targeted. The primary
pollution problems on the Cuyahoga were the result of numerous
sources, however. As Hines observed, "[w]here the polluted state of
a stream results from the cumulative effect of the discharges of car-
ried effluents from several different points, it is nearly impossible to
prove that a particular polluter is responsible for the damage."',
88
Even had local landowners been able to identify which companies
along the river were responsible for the pollution, they would have
had a hard time satisfying the traditional requirements for a private
nuisance claim. In order to bring such a claim, a plaintiff must a)
have suffered material harm that is b) different from the harm suf-
fered by the public generally.' 89 Thus, even if polluting activity was
causing environmental harm in a given location, there may not be
any private party capable of filing suit. In the case of the Cuyahoga,
for example, it may have been difficult for local landowners to iden-
tify a specific material harm suffered due to the accumulation of oil
and chemicals in the water that was not shared by the public at large.
Only those landowners, such as the railroads perhaps, that suffered
discrete material harm due to pollution - perhaps such as railroad
185. Betty Klaric, Legal Aid Society Joins Pollution Fight,
CLEVELAND PRESS, Dec. 6, 1968, at B13. Some nuisance claims
against industrial firms were filed, however, and would occasionally
result in out of court settlements. In one case, an industrial plant
settled with a neighboring car dealer alleging that air pollution from
the plant damaged vehicles and equipment. See, e.g., Bus Bergen,
One Firm Pays Another $47,500 for Pollution Harm - A First Here,
CLEVELAND PRESS, Dec. 14, 1968, at C2.
186. Hines I, supra note 119, at 198. See also Andrew Jackson
Heimert, Keeping Pigs Out of Parlors: Using Nuisance Law to Af-
fect the Location of Pollution, 27 ENVTL. L. 403, 415 (1997).
187. Cuyahoga River Put Among the Most Rank, CLEVELAND
PLAiN DEALER, Oct. 3, 1968, at 10.
188. Hines I, supra note 119, at 198.
189. Id. at 197-98.
[VOL. XIV
FABLES OF THE CUYAHOGA
owners whose property was damaged by the various river fires -
would have been able to bring a private nuisance claim. Even then,
a private nuisance claim would have been difficult given the prevail-
ing condition of the river. Insofar as a nuisance represents "a right
thing in the wrong place," the industrial facilities along the Cuya-
hoga were more akin to pigs in the barnyard than pigs in the par-
lor.19
0
Private nuisance actions against much Cuyahoga pollution would
have been difficult, if not impossible. Public nuisance actions, on
the other hand, should have been viable, at least in some instances.
Under state law at the time, water pollution was generally considered
a public nuisance.1 91 This would imply that individuals, or at least
local government officials, could file common law actions against
polluting companies and facilities for unreasonably interfering in the
public's rights in the Cuyahoga.' 92 Under Ohio law, however, indus-
trial facilities discharging effluent into public waters pursuant to a
valid permit from the state Water Pollution Control Board could not
be charged with creating a public nuisance. 193 Ohio law declared that
it was illegal to "cause pollution ... of any waters of the state, or
place or cause to be placed any sewage, industrial waste, or other
wastes in a location where they cause pollution of any waters of the
state."' 94 Such actions were declared public nuisances, "except in
190. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388
(1926)(describing a nuisance as "merely a right thing in the wrong
place, - like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard"). See also
Andrew Jackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs Out of Parlors: Using Nui-
sance Law to Affect the Location of Pollution, 27 ENvTL. L. 403,
409 (1997) ("Location is almost everything in nuisance law.... The
vast majority of activities are lawful in the abstract, but become nui-
sances per accidens 'by reason of their location, or by the reason of
the manner in which they are constructed, maintained, or oper-
ated."'(quoting Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 687
(N.C. 1953)).
191. Reitze, supra note 94, at 64.
192. Id. at 64. The Restatement of Torts defines a public nuisance
as "an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
193. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 6111.04 (1968).
194. Id. Pollution was defined as "the placing of any noxious or
deleterious substances in any waters of the state or affecting the
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such cases where the water pollution control board has issued a valid
and unexpired permit."'195 As Arnold Reitze noted in his 1968 re-
view of Lake Erie pollution, "[c]ommon law actions for water pollu-
tion abatement are not common and perhaps the protection afforded
by the permit system is the reason."'1 96 Common law may not have
been the perfect tool with which to combat water pollution, but it
may have been more effective had it been allowed to operate.' 97
F. Suing the City
The severity of the legal obstacles to local cleanup efforts were
demonstrated in litigation initiated by local environmental activists
to force greater pollution control on the Cuyahoga River. In the ab-
sence of effective private nuisance remedies, local environmental
advocates sought to force greater pollution control efforts by city
properties of any waters of the state in a manner which renders such
waters harmful or inimical to the public health, or to animal or
aquatic life, or to the use of such waters for domestic water supply,
or industrial or agricultural purposes, or for recreation." Id. at
§6111.01 (1968).
195. Id. at § 6111.04 (1968).
196. Reitze, supra note 94, at 64.
197. See Roger Meiners, et al., Burning Rivers, Common Law, and
Institutional Choice, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT
61 (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000)(noting "the
river burned because common law rights that might have precluded
its conversion to an industrial dump were blunted by the Ohio legis-
lature"). It would be an exaggeration to claim that the permits
shielded polluters from all common law actions. See id at 61; see
also Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing
and Environmental Protection, 12 DuKE ENV. L. & POL'Y F. 39, 76
(2001). The state water pollution law had a savings clause specifi-
cally preserving equity and common law rights. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 6111.08 (1968). Given the explicit preemption of public
nuisance suits, this provision would likely have preserve private nui-
sance claims, had such claims been viable. It is also worth noting
that there was at least some question as to whether state pollution
control laws preempted other local regulatory actions. See, e.g.,
Soap & Detergent Association v. Akron: Some Legal Difficulties in
Local Efforts to Control Pollution, 1 ENVTL. L. REP. 10043 (1971).
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officials. In May 1965, several residents of Cleveland brought suit
to force the city to enforce local pollution control ordinances against
industrial facilities that were polluting the Cuyahoga river and its
tributaries. 98 In the alternative, the plaintiffs sought to force the city
to abate the industrial pollution as a public nuisance. In their peti-
tion for a writ of mandamus, the plaintiffs identified several indus-
trial facilities along the Cuyahoga which, plaintiffs alleged, dis-
charged waste into the river. 1 99 The plaintiffs maintained that the
city was derelict in its responsibilities to enforce local pollution con-
trol ordinances and generally to investigate and enjoin nuisances
created by polluting activity on the river.
Although city officials would begin to aggressively support envi-
ronmental cleanup measures during the course of the litigation, the
city actively defended itself from the suit. z°° The city maintained
that plaintiffs had no legal basis to seek a writ requiring enforcement
of city ordinances. The city argued, among other things, that en-
forcement of its municipal ordinances against the polluting firms
would be "improper because of existing state licenses." 20 1 In its
brief to the Court of Common Pleas, the city maintained "[t]he City
is powerless to enforce its own municipal ordinances because said
ordinances are in direct conflict with state statutes on the same sub-
198. See Blaushild Pollution Suit to Be Pushed, CLEVELAND PRESS,
Feb. 28, 1969, at 12-A.
199. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Bar Realty Corp. v. Locher,
Case No. 813769, at 5-7. (Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga
County, Aug. 10, 1970).
200. The change appears to have occurred with the change in po-
litical administrations from that of Mayor Locher to that of Mayor
Stokes.
201. Summation Brief of Defendants-Respondents, Bar Realty
Corp. v. Locher, Case No. 813769, at 2. (Court of Common Pleas,
Cuyahoga County, Aug. 10, 1970). The city also maintained that
enforcement actions against one company, the Cuyahoga Meat
Company was unnecessary because it deposited its wastes into the
Cleveland sewers, not the Cuyahoga. Id.
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ject; as such they are unenforceable." 20 2 In Ohio, where municipal
ordinances and state laws conflict, the state laws are supreme.
2 0 3
The trial court granted a supplemental writ further directing city
officials to "manage and supervise the elimination, control or regula-
tion of any matter relating to the pollution" of local water bodies and
to investigate the extent to which various firms, including but not
limited to those identified by plaintiffs, were violating Cleveland's
local pollution ordinances. 20 4 This judgment was affirmed by the
appellate court.
20 5
The city appealed the case to the Supreme Court of Ohio maintain-
ing, among other things, that the plaintiffs could not obtain a writ of
mandamus forcing city officers to enforce police regulations against
specific parties and that such actions were preempted by state regula-
tion. In particular, the city argued that industrial permits issued by
the state Water Pollution Control Board granted licenses to emit in-
dustrial wastes into the Cuyahoga, and that the city was powerless to
prevent this pollution. The Ohio Supreme Court eventually upheld
this argument, leaving local officials and environmental advocates
little ability to force river cleanup.
At the time of the suit, Cleveland's municipal ordinance required
the city's Commissioner of the Division of Water Pollution control
"to manage and supervise the elimination, control or regulation of
any matter relating to the pollution of water-courses, rivers, streams
or lakes bounding upon or within the city."20 6 As interpreted by the
Supreme Court, the ordinance granted the commissioner a requisite
amount of discretion to determine whether water pollution needed to
be controlled in a given case. The ordinance, by conferring a duty
202. Summation Brief of Defendants-Respondents, Bar Realty
Corp. v. Locher, Case No. 813769, at 2. (Court of Common Pleas,
Cuyahoga County, Aug. 10, 1970).
203. Under Article XVIII § 3 of the Ohio Constitution, municipali-
ties only have the authority to adopt "local police, sanitary and other
similar regulations as are not in conflict with General Laws." See
also Anderson v. Brown, 233 N.E. 2d 864 (Ohio 1968) (municipality
may not prohibit action permitted or licensed by the state); and Vil-
lage of Struthers v. Sokol, 149 N.E. 519 (Ohio 1923).
204. Bar Realty Corp. v. Locher, Case No. 813769 (Court of
Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, Aug. 10, 1970).
205. Bar Realty Corp. v. Locher (Ohio Ct. App. June 16, 1971).
206. Bar Realty Corp. v. Locher, 283 N.E.2d 164, 194 (Ohio 1972).
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upon the commissioner, "necessarily vests that officer ... authority
to find either that violations of the ordinances do or do not exist.,
20 7
In other words, whether the pollution constituted a public nuisance
that required abatement was a question to be answered by the com-
missioner in the exercise of his discretion. Despite the rampant pol-
lution in the river at the time, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs
failed to show that the commissioner had abused his discretion in
failing to seek additional controls on local polluting industries
20 8
Further, the Court found it completely acceptable for local officials
to defer to the pollution control efforts (or lack thereof) of the state
209Water Pollution Control Board. In other words, whether the
Cuyahoga would be protected from industrial pollution was a deci-
sion to be made by the state. Area residents, local officials, even
those whose common law rights were violated by industrial pollu-
tion, had few viable options other than to convince state officials to
change their policies or, perhaps, to encourage the federal govern-
ment to intervene.2
10
G. Where Was Uncle Sam?
It is odd that states are routinely characterized as the laggards in
pollution control efforts when the federal government debated - but
failed to enact - meaningful water pollution control legislation for
decades.211 State programs were far from perfect - quite far, in the
case of Ohio - but at least there were state programs that sought to
stem the rising tide of water pollution. Although the federal gov-
ernment had already asserted its interest in the maintenance of navi-
gable waterways and the protection of water quality, and enacted
policies premised upon this interest, it devoted minimal resources for
their implementation. There was substantial interest in water quality
207. Id. at 194.
208. Id. at 195.
209. Id.
210. Testifying before Congress in 1970, Mayor Stokes did just
that, calling upon Congress to enact federal legislation so that the
city would have more control over local water quality. See Stokes
Testimony, supra note 5; see also Meiners, et al., supra note 197, at
62.
211. This history is recounted in Hines III, supra note 77, at 805-
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in Congress, and water pollution measures were routinely introduced
beginning in the late Nineteenth Century, but relatively few meas-
ures were enacted.212 At the same time, the federal government
failed to use the tools at its disposal to assist states and local com-
munities to combat the pollution of rivers such as the Cuyahoga.
21 3
Criticism of pre-1969 state efforts should not obscure the federal
government's failure to act to protect the nation's waters.
In 1948, Congress enacted federal legislation to assist and support
state and local water pollution control efforts. This act provided for
technical assistance from the Surgeon General and Public Health
Service, but provided little real financial support to state and local
214governments. Indeed, the law only authorized $1 million per year
in annual appropriations, and Congress failed to appropriate any of
the authorized funds during the first year the law was in effect.
2 15
From 1950 to 1952 Congress authorized a substantial amount of
money for pollution control, $83.4 million - but Congress only ap-
propriated a fraction of the authorized funds, $9.4 million.216 Addi-
tional federal measures were enacted in 1956 and 1961.
Congress substantially reformed pollution control efforts with the
Water Quality Act of 1965. Among other things, this law, created a
Federal Water Pollution Control Administration in the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare; increased authorizations for con-
struction grants to $150 million (with a maximum of $4.8 million for
any one project); authorized $20 million for research and develop-
212. Between 1886 and 1972, water pollution legislation was intro-
duced in all but six sessions of Congress. Id. at 803 (legislation in-
troduced in all but six sessions from 1886-1966); and Houck, supra
note 83, at 2286 (water pollution legislation introduced every year
from 1966 to 1972).
213. There is also evidence that federal activity actually contrib-
uted to the local pollution problem, particularly in Lake Erie. See,
e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, CONFERENCE
IN THE MATTER OF POLLUTION OF LAKE ERIE AND ITS TRIBUTARIES,
PROCEEDINGS Vol. 1, 32-37 (Aug. 1965) (statement of Congressman
Charles A. Vanik on U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' practice of de-
positing dredged material from Cuyahoga River into Lake Erie).
214. See Hines III, supra note 77, at 811-12.
215. Id. at 811, 813. The law also provided for loans to state and
local governments to finance infrastructure improvements.
216. Id. at 813.
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ment on pollution control; required the adoption of state water qual-
ity standards and authorized federal standards where states failed to
act; and modestly extended federal enforcement authority. 217 In
1966, Congress made further amendments, again increasing financial
authorizations. 2 1
8
In the 1950s and 1960s, federal appropriations for pollution control
were quite small. Even when substantial sums were authorized, the
money was rarely appropriated. By the later 1960s, federal expendi-
tures increased, but the federal government's financial commitment
to environmental concerns was still rather small, particularly in
comparison to the 1968 Cleveland bond issue. Federal spending and
loans for water purification and pollution control in 1968 totaled
$190 million219 - not even double the amount approved by Cleve-
land voters that same year. Of that total, only approximately $6 mil-
lion was slated for Ohio.22 ° Cleveland received nothing. While
Congress authorized $700 million for water projects for fiscal 1968-
69, only $214 million was appropriated, and of that Ohio received a
scant $9 million.2 2 Federal officials spoke regularly about the need
to improve the nation's water quality, but their talk was backed by
minimal action.
The relative lack of federal financing for local pollution control ef-
forts in the 1960s reflected the low priority that federal officials
placed on environmental concerns. In prior decades, it could be ar-
gued that Congress' failure to appropriate money represented the
traditional view that federal government should focus federal re-
sources on truly national concerns, leaving state and local govern-
ments to fund state and local projects, including river cleanup. Yet
in the 1960s the federal government appropriated tremendous sums
to pay for community development and other Great Society pro-
grams. Congress had overcome its reluctance to spend money on
local matters where Congress deemed it important enough to do so.
217. Id. at 829-30.
218. Id. at 837-38.
219. Reitze, supra note 94, at 68.
220. Id.
221. Stokes Testimony, supra note 5, at 413 ("even though [Cleve-
land] has over the last four years spent $30 million on construction
of waste treatment facilities not one dime of that has come from the
Federal Government").
222. Stavish, supra note 42, at 129.
2002]
132 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL
Environmental cleanup was simply not yet a sufficient priority at the
national level. The severity of local pollution problems was more
readily apparent at the local level, so the pressure for environmental
cleanup largely remained a local phenomenon.
223
The federal government's historical lack of concern for environ-
mental contamination is reflected not only in the lack of appropria-
tions, but also in the operation of federal facilities and the implemen-
tation of federal programs. In November 1965, President Johnson
ordered all federal installations to provide secondary waste treatment
at a minimum. 224 Despite this decree, federal facilities remained a
substantial pollution problem. In 1966, 237 federal installations con-
tinued to discharge insufficiently treated waste into domestic wa-
ters.225
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also contributed to the pollu-
tion of Lake Erie, depositing contaminated dredge from the bottom
of the Cuyahoga into Lake Erie on a regular basis. The Corps
dumped over one million cubic yards per year from the Cuyahoga
and Cleveland's outer harbor each year in the late 1960s.226 The
1965 Federal Water Pollution Control Act aimed to force the Corps
to clean up its act, but by 1968 there had been no progress on this
front, and the Corps "continue[d] to dump highly polluted wastes
into areas of Lake Erie still relatively undefiled. ' '227 Although criti-
cized for the practice, the Corps defended its actions as cost-
justified.228
In December 1970, the federal government notified the City of
Cleveland that it was violating state and federal water quality stan-
dards.229 This prompted an angry retort from Mayor Stokes, who
223. For a discussion of the importance of local knowledge in iden-
tifying and addressing environmental concerns, see Adler, Let 50
Flowers Bloom, supra note 127, at 11,286.
224. Prevention, Control, and Abatement of Water Pollution by
Federal Activities, Exec. Order. No. 11,258, 40 Fed. Reg. 14,483
(1965) rev'dExec. Order. No. 11,288, 31 Fed. Reg. 6,857 (1965).
225. Reitze, supra note 94, at 15.
226. Id. at 35.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Letter from William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, to Carl Stokes, Mayor, City of Cleve-
land (December 9, 1970).
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accused newly appointed EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus
of engaging in "a cheap political plot" and ignoring "the outrageous,
atrocious failure of his federal government to put a dime into Cleve-
land's sewer program." 23° Stokes further noted that Cleveland had
taken greater action than most other Great Lakes cities and that the
city's financial commitment to abating water pollution, exemplified
by the $100 million bond issue, rivaled that of the federal govern-
ment nationwide.231 In Stokes' view, the federal government had
been more deficient in meeting its obligations than had the city of
Cleveland.
It is also possible to argue that the federal government was derelict
in discharging its statutory obligations to protect the navigability of
waters used in interstate commerce. 232 After all, the federal govern-
ment has asserted authority over navigable interstate waters since the
23
nation's inception, albeit focusing on navigability as such. 2  The
case for federal intervention in environmental matters is also particu-
larly strong where, as in the case with many navigable waters, the
environmental concern in question stretches across multiple political
boundaries. 3 Unlike individual states, the federal government "has
jurisdiction over a larger area and thus can deal with the problem
more comprehensively." 
235
Federal legislation prohibiting the deposit of refuse into navigable
waterways and harbors sat in the U.S. Code for decades before the
federal government made any effort to enforce such provisions
against polluting activities. Under the federal Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899,236 also known as the "Refuse Act,' 237 it was unlawful to
230. Statement of Mayor Carl B. Stokes, National League of Cities,
Atlanta, Georgia, December 10, 1970.
231. Id.
232. In this regard I am referring to waters actually used in inter-
state commerce, not those waters that could be used or might other-
wise fall within more expansive interpretations of the federal gov-
ernment's jurisdiction, such as that at issue in Solid Waste Agency
of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531
U.S. 159 (2001).
233. Reitze, supra note 94, at 49.
234. See supra note 127, and source cited therein.
235. Reitze, supra note 94, at 77.
236. Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30
Stat. 1151 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§401 etseq.).
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deposit "refuse" from shore into a navigable water of the United
States.238  Refuse was defined to include all pollutants, including
gasoline accidentally discharged into a navigable river, save non-
point source pollution such as runoff.239 The act provided for both
criminal sanctions, as well as private actions for damages if a pollut-
ing company failed to observe the requisite amount of care. 24 0 Yet
prior to the 1960s, this authority was rarely invoked.24'
In 1966, the Supreme Court held that the Rivers and Harbors Act
prohibited the accidental release of commercially valuable sub-
stances, such as gasoline.242 In United States v. Standard Oil, an oil
company was prosecuted for illegally discharging aviation fuel into
the St. Johns River after a shut-off valve was "accidentally" left
243open. Rejecting the argument that commercially valuable material
could not be considered "refuse" under the Act, the Court held that
"Oil is oil and whether useable or not by industrial standards it has
the same deleterious effect on waterways. In either case, its presence
237. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 252 (2d ed.
1994).
238. 33 U.S.C. § 407. This provision of the act provides, among
other things, that "[i]t shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or de-
posit, or cause, suffer, or procure to be thrown, discharged, or depos-
ited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft of
any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or
mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description what-
ever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing
therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water of the United
States, or into any tributary of any navigable water from which the
same shall float or be washed into such navigable water." Id. It
similarly prohibits depositing refuse along the banks of a navigable
river "Where the same shall be liable to be washed into such naviga-
ble water . . whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or ob-
structed." Id.
239. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224
(1966).
240. 33 U.S.C. § 411, 412. See also Reitze, supra note 94, at 62.
241. The federal government also failed to utilize the enforcement
provisions of other pre- 1972 federal statutes, such as those provided
under the 1956 and 1965 federal water pollution control statutes.
242. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
243. Id. at 225 (quotes in original).
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in our rivers and harbors is both a menace to navigation and a pollut-
ant. ,24
4
Even if the Rivers and Harbors Act had not always been under-
stood to prohibit such pollution,245 the Supreme Court's decision in
Standard Oil provided ample justification for federal prosecution of
refineries and other industrial facilities along the Cuyahoga that were
discharging or otherwise allowing oil and other potentially flamma-
ble substances to pollute the river. Indeed, given that the fire risk on
the river was clearly recognized as a potential obstruction to the
river's navigability and use in interstate commerce, the federal gov-
ernment would have had ample reason to take action. Such prosecu-
tions would not have addressed many aspects of the water pollution
problem at the time. Invocation of the Refuse Act would have done
little to remedy inadequate sewage treatment. Nonetheless, prosecu-
tions under this law could well have helped to address the problem
of waste oil, debris, and other flammable materials. In other words,
enforcing the longstanding federal prohibition on dumping refuse
into navigable waters could well have prevented the 1969 Cuyahoga
fire, if not any of the earlier fires as well.
24 6
Only after the June 1969 fire became a national cause celebre was
the condition of the Cuyahoga "objectionable" to federal officials. 247
244. Id.
245. For a discussion of earlier interpretations of the Act, see Wil-
liam H. Rodgers, Jr., Industrial Water Pollution and the Refuse Act:
A Second Chance for Water Quality, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 761, 772-74
(1971).
246. According to David Hodas, in 1969 "the government could
only bring enforcement actions against those dischargers that it
could show had caused the river to ignite." David R. Hodas, En-
forcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System:
Can Three Not be a Crowd when Enforcement Authority Is Shared
by the United States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REv.
1552, 1554 (1995). While it is clear that the federal government
failed to bring any enforcement actions against facilities polluting
the Cuyahoga prior to the June 1969 fire, it is unclear why the fed-
eral government would have been precluded from such action under
the Rivers and Harbors Act given the holding in United States v.
Standard Oil, 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
247. See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW &
POLICY: NATURE, LAW & SOCIETY 510 (1998) (noting "The Cuya-
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After the fire received national media attention, the federal govern-
ment sprang into action, invoking both the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899 and the 1965 water quality law against polluting firms. In
August, the U.S. Department of the Interior invoked the 1965 act for
the first time, threatening six industrial firms with prosecution if they
did not curtail their pollution.248 Among those charged were several
steel facilities on the Cuyahoga, including plants operated by Repub-
lic Steel Corporation and Jones & Laughlin Steel Company.249 Sev-
eral additional prosecutions were threatened in May 1970.250 Al-
though the cumbersome nature of enforcement proceedings under
the act may have discouraged the federal government from filing
many suits, it is unlikely that factor fully explains the failure to util-
ize the act until 1970. It seems more likely that changes in enforce-
ment were a response to political pressure for more federal involve-
ment in pollution control efforts, brought about by increased public
attention to environmental matters.
Between October 1, 1969 and April 15, 1970, the U.S. Department
of Justice initiated sixty-six prosecutions under the Rivers and Har-
bors Act. 25 Additional prosecutions were spurred by Congressionalpressure and the filing of qui tam actions by private citizens. 252 The
hoga River was not considered legally objectionable until it caught
fire, because the state-designated use of that river was waste dis-
posal."). In a bit of understatement, the General Accounting Office
reported in 1972 that "Prior to 1970 the Federal Government did not
make maximum use of its enforcement authority." U.S. General Ac-
counting Office, Water Pollution Abatement Program: Assessment
of Federal and State Enforcement Efforts, B-166506 (Mar. 23,
1972), at 9.
248. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 45 (1970).
249. Water Polluters Who Fail to Act Face Federal Suit, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 1969, at 1. The citations prompted some cleanup,
but civil and criminal charges were later filed against Jones &
Laughlin Steel. See U.S. Sues LTV's J&L Alleging Water Pollution
by Plant in Cleveland, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 1970, at 9.
250. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 45 (1970).
251. Rodgers, supra note 245, at 792-93.
252. Id. at 768. See also U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, CONSERVATION AND
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northeastern Ohio chapter of the Sierra Club investigated industrial
facilities and filed petitions with the Justice Department seeking ad-
ditional enforcement actions. 253 Corporations long used to the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers' loose enforcement of the law's permitting
requirements were understandably dismayed. One corporate repre-
sentative complained that "the use of the archaic 1899 law is disrup-
tive to the orderly improvement of water quality and provides propa-
ganda to be used to undermine the effectiveness of the State and
Federal programs." 254 Indeed, such complaints may have helped
spur enactment of federal pollution control legislation that would
provide more certainty to national corporations. It is also signifi-
cant that enforcement under both laws increased substantially after
formation of the federal EPA in December 1970.256
NATURAL RESOURCES SUBCOMMITTEE, 9 1ST CONG., 2D SESSION, Qul
TAM ACTIONS AND THE 1899 REFUSE ACT: CITIZEN LAWSUITS
AGAINST POLLUTERS OF THE NATION'S WATERWAYS (Comm. Print.
1970).
253. KEHOE, supra note 75, at 123.
254. Rodgers, supra note 245, at 773 (quoting statement of Samuel
Lenher, Vice President, E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. before Sen-
ate Subcommittee on Air & Water Pollution, 1970).
255. This is implied in Houck, supra note 83, at 2289-90 (citing
Lenher testimony). See also James MacGregor, Companies Com-
plain that Pollution Laws Conflict, Change Often, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 23, 1970, at 1. While the evidence on this point is ambiguous,
it is well-established that some industry groups supported the enact-
ment of federal environmental legislation to provide greater regula-
tory certainty or to preempt other, more intrusive, regulatory re-
gimes. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statu-
tory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 313, 326-29 (1985). For a broader discussion of in-
dustry efforts in support of federal regulation that could provide eco-
nomic or other benefits, see Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Politics, Dirty
Profits: Rent-Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, in POLITICAL
ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN 1-30
(Terry L. Anderson ed., 2000).
256. U.S. General Accounting Office, Water Pollution Abatement
Program: Assessment of Federal and State Enforcement Efforts, B-
166506 (Mar. 23, 1972), at 9.
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Two years later, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution
Control Amendments of 1972, the law that is conventionally referred
to as the "Clean Water Act" today.257 This law helped address water
pollution in the Cuyahoga and in many areas by, among other things,
creating the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. The
imposition of strict technology standards on many industries un-
doubtedly accelerated the rate of cleanup in some areas. 2 5 Yet it is
important to remember that prior to 1972 the federal government had
potentially powerful tools to address at least some aspects of the na-
tion's water pollution problems, and to address, in particular, the
sorts of pollution which directly led to the June 1969 fire. This does
not mean that the 1972 Clean Water Act was unnecessary or unwise.
It could, however, modulate one's views of the need for the sort of
legislation that Congress eventually adopted.
The conventional view criticizes state and local governments for
failing to act to control water pollution. As already noted, state and
local efforts in the 1960s were making environmental progress, and
there is reason to believe that such efforts would pick up steam in the
years to come. Before 1969, many localities, including Cleveland,
had already embarked on a long, difficult road to reverse the course
of local pollution trends. Their initial efforts were insufficient, and
industrial waters such as the Cuyahoga would remain polluted for
some time, but state and local efforts represented a significant start.
Before asking why state and local governments did such a poor job
in addressing environmental concerns in the post-World War II dec-
ades, one could just as easily ask why the federal government failed
to discharge its few responsibilities and commitments with regard to
interstate navigable waters. When considering why the Cuyahoga
River burned in 1969, it seems there should be enough blame to go
around.
II. RECONSTRUCTION OF THE FABLE
The conventional fables of the Cuyahoga may impart useful les-
sons about the need for environmental protection, but they are inac-
curate in many crucial respects. They sensationalize the June 1969
fire and underestimate the potential for institutional arrangements
257. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1385 (1994).
258. See Freeman, supra note 126.
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other than federal command-and-control regulation to address water
pollution concerns. The simple story of the fire must yield to the far
more complicated history of pollution on the Cuyahoga River.
The Cuyahoga River burned in 1969, but the river's plight was
likely improving at the time. The city of Cleveland could not stop
its river from burning one last time, but it had begun to make sub-
stantial investments to restore the Cuyahoga. Common law causes
of action did not sufficiently discipline polluters along the river to
prevent rampant pollution, but the cause of action most suited to the
Cuyahoga's plight was preempted under state law.25 9 The state of
Ohio may have allowed pollution in the Cuyahoga to accumulate,
but the state had also begun to consider additional pollution control
methods, just as many states across the nation were beginning to
address their pollution concerns. Federal assistance helped to ad-
dress the chronic problem of Cuyahoga pollution, but federal neglect
of long-standing legal obligations and failure to consider the envi-
ronmental impacts of its own actions may also have played a role.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 certainly
accelerated the rate of environmental cleanup in many of the nation's
waters, but there is also reason to suspect that the die was cast, and
the nation would have demanded greater levels of environmental
protection even had Congress failed to act.
The 1969 fire was a catalyst for change because it was the right
event at the right time. It was neither an impressive fire, nor one
with a significant ecological impact. It may have signified wide-
spread ecological degradation, but it did not represent a continuing
decline in water quality. As noted above, it appears water quality
was improving in much of the nation, at least for some measures.
Yet because the nation's ecological consciousness was aroused, the
fire provoked a strong political response. "What the uproar over the
Cuyahoga River fire of 1969 proved - since the river also had caught
fire in the 1930s and 1950s without much comment - is that the af-
259. It is also worth recalling that the use of nuisance actions in
interstate waters, perhaps such as Lake Erie, would later be pre-
empted by federal legislation. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451
U.S. 304 (1981).
260. See FREEMAN, supra note 126, and accompanying text.
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fluent society does not want to be the effluent society," notes envi-
ronmental analyst Steven Hayward.26'
In the 1950s, let alone the 1910s or 1930s, environmental issues
did not yet rank with concerns for economic development, techno-
logical progress, and addressing other social ills. "Employment,
basic nutrition, adequate housing, and avoidance of contagious dis-
eases were seen as far more valuable at the margin that clean water
in a river lined by productive factories., 262 This was due, in no
small part, to a combination of factors, including relative public ig-
norance about environmental matters, including the health impacts
of pollution, as well as a widespread belief that some pollution was
an acceptable price for industrial progress. Insofar as environmental
protection was an item on the public agenda, concern focused on
sanitation and drinking water, not the recreational or aesthetic values
of waterways. As public concern for environmental values in-
creased, however, it appears that all societal institutions began to
address these concerns, and it is not clear that the federal govern-
ment should be privileged as the most beneficent of the available
institutions.
Environmental analyst Indur Goklany presents a hypothesis about
air pollution trends that could well explain much of the history of
water pollution on the Cuyahoga. Goklany notes that pollution
trends, and the drive to federalize pollution control, "must be viewed
in the broader context of the social, economic, technological, and
political factors that affect the generation and control" of pollu-
tion.263 Specifically, it is important to distinguish between pollution
trends before and after the period "during which a substance . ..
gains sufficient notoriety to be perceived as a . . .pollutant by the
public and, perhaps more importantly, by policymakers." 264 Trends
prior to this "period of perception" are not indicative of the institu-
tional capability of those institutions primarily responsible for pollu-
261. Steven Hayward, Crossroads, It's Earth Day, MILWAUKEE
JOURNAL SENTINEL, April 22, 2001.
262. "Employment, basic nutrition, adequate housing, and avoid-
ance of contagious diseases were seen as far more valuable at the
margin that clean water in a river lined by productive factories."
Meiners et al., supra note 197, at 59-60.
263. INDUR GOKLANY, CLEARING THE AIR: THE REAL STORY OF
THE WAR ON AIR POLLUTION 3 (1999).
264. Id. at 3.
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tion control at the time, as such institutions were not yet called upon
to address such concerns. Only after the period of perception begins
can we evaluate the extent to which a given institutional arrangement
or combination of arrangements failed to address the environmental
265
concern in question. Even then some caution is warranted, as the
failure of one institutional arrangement can only be assessed in com-
parison to the likely success of other potential arrangements.
266
In the context of air pollution, Goklany's work raises questions
about the ultimate necessity of much federal air pollution regula-
267tion. Specifically, he notes that trends in air pollution began to
improve after the period of perception for each air pollutant, but in
many cases prior to the enactment of federal legislation. Such trends
are consistent with the Environmental Kuznets Curve documented in
much economic literature. 268 As populations become wealthier, both
their willingness and ability to pay for environmental protection in-
crease dramatically. At the same time, increases in development
265. As Goklany explains, "Prior to such recognition, one cannot
expect any societal action - whether at the local, state, or federal
level - designed specifically to reduce the presence of the substance
in the environment. Thus, trends (or lack thereof) before that time
tell us little about a particular level of jurisdiction's sensitivity to, or
ability to deal with, environmental pollution per se." Id.
266. Comparative institutional analysis avoids what is often re-
ferred to as the "nirvana" problem in which an obviously imperfect
institutional arrangement is compared with a hypothesized ideal
norm. As Harold Demsetz explains, this approach attempts "to as-
sess which alternative real institutional arrangement seems best able
to cope with the . . . problem." Harold Demsetz, Information and
Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1969) (emphasis
added).
267. See generally GOKLANY, supra note 263, chapter 6. Goklany
argues that "long before the federal government essentially took over
air pollution control in the United States, matters had begun to im-
prove, especially for the pollutants associated with excess mortality
during the air pollution episodes of the 1940s, 50s and 60s (TSP and
SO)" Id. at 94.
268. For a summary of the environmental Kuznets Curve literature,
see Bruce Yandle, Maya Vijayaraghavan & Madhusudan Bhattarai,
The Environmental Kuznets Curve: A Primer, PERC RESEARCH
STuDY 02-01 (May 2002).
20021
142 FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LAWJOURNAL
tends to coincide with increases in technological capabilities and the
accumulation of scientific and other knowledge which may reveal
heretofore unknown aspects of environmental problems, further
heightening the desire for change.269
The history of water pollution on the Cuyahoga River is consistent
with Goklany's hypothesis. As Hines noted in 1966, "[p]ublic in-
terest in safeguarding the quality of water in a state has generally
paralleled the economic development of the state." 27° Increased de-
velopment leads to increased water use and pollution. Over time,
these pressures, combined with the increased wealth generated by
economic development, lead to greater public awareness about, and
demand for, pollution control and environmental protection more
generally. At the same time, "[a]s public awareness of the serious-
ness of the pollution problem increases, the ability of special interest
groups to sidetrack reform efforts decreases markedly."271 While the
environmental problems that plagued Cleveland and other cities are
obvious in hindsight, the nature and extent of these problems were
not always readily apparent at the time.272 Indeed, much information
about the severity of pollution in Lake Erie, and its ecological effect,
was not known until the late 1960s. This makes it more difficult to
place the exclusive blame for local pollution on states, local gov-
ernments, the inadequacy of common law remedies, or any other
institution one hopes would address environmental concerns.
As the Lower Cuyahoga River Basin developed in the late nine-
teenth century, local residents were primarily concerned with eco-
nomic development and its material benefits. What pollution was
obvious at the time was viewed as an attendant, and likely worth-
while, cost of industrial production. Over time, the pollution wors-
ened and local populations grew more affluent. Both trends in-
creased the demand for cleanup, at least for those pollutants that had
269. See GOKLANY, supra note 263, at 89.
270. Hines I, supra note 119, at 201.
271. Id.
272. It is also worth noting that many parts of the nation were deal-
ing with other "environmental" problems, such as the provision of
clean drinking water and the control of diseases such as cholera and
typhoid, that were understandably viewed as more urgent than the
occasional fire on an industrialized stretch of river. See Meiners, et
al., supra note 197, at 60.
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a readily observable impact on water quality.273 The period of per-
ception for certain wastes in the river may well have been triggered
by some of the earlier fires, perhaps the major blaze of 1952. As
perception developed, citizens and community groups became in-
creasingly interested in repairing the river. This perception devel-
oped first at the local level, as local individuals had greater knowl-
edge about the plight of the river and the real consequences of an
unprotected Cuyahoga.
The evidence suggests that the local period of perception occurred
well before 1969, when local efforts to restore and protect the Cuya-
hoga began. Local efforts were hampered, by institutional limita-
tions of the common law, as well as by state regulations which inhib-
ited Cleveland's ability to address the problem directly, such as
through public nuisance actions. Both the state and federal govern-
ments were relatively unresponsive to local concerns at this time
because, while the problems of the Cuyahoga were abundantly clear
to locals and experts, the relevant state and national policymaking
communities had not yet reached their respective period of percep-
tion. Indeed, the pattern of federal enforcement (or lack thereof) of
the Rivers and Harbors Act suggests that it was not until the June
1969 fire that the period of perception was reached at the federal
level.
There is no doubt that the Cuyahoga River was horribly polluted
for much of the Twentieth Century. Industrialization and regional
population growth increased the demand for waste disposal in local
waters, and environmental concerns had yet to emerge on the pub-
lic's agenda. Drinking water and sanitation were pressing concerns
early on, and the city responded. However strange it may seem to-
day, the ecological health of the Cuyahoga River or Lake Erie would
not arouse significant public concern until many decades later, at
which point the pollution problems were severe and would require
years - if not decades - to redress. For these reasons, it makes no
more sense to blame state and local governments for the gross pollu-
273. As Goklany notes, "since the timing of a transition depends
upon the specific pollutant (or indicator) and the relative social, eco-
nomic, and environmental costs and benefits of addressing that pol-
lutant (or indicator), it is possible for a society, a group, or an indi-
vidual to be simultaneously be to the left of the environmental transi-
tion for one pollutant but to the right of another." GOKLANY, supra
note 263, at 95.
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tion of this period than it makes sense to blame the federal govern-
ment or any other institutional force. The river was polluted, in large
part, because there was not yet sufficient public demand to see it
cleaned up.
When the demand for greater pollution control emerged, various
institutions all began to meet this demand in various ways, strug-
gling their way up the learning curve to address the environmental
plight of the river. Cleaning the Cuyahoga was a dramatic undertak-
ing of the sort that had not been contemplated prior to the 1960s.
Thus it was inevitable that early cleanup and control efforts would
be insufficient and occasionally fail. There is no reason to believe
that policy makers at any level of government would get it "right" on
their first attempt. When judging a given institutional arrangement's
success, or lack thereof, it is important to compare it against the po-
tential alternatives, and not the aspiration of perfection.
274
That there was a growing demand for greater environmental pro-
tection in the late 1960s and early 1970s does not mean that the
adoption of centralized federal regulatory measures was either inevi-
table or desirable. As Tseming Yang notes, "it is highly unlikely
that the public and political pressures that led to the creation of the
environmental regulatory system in the first place would have sim-
ply dissipated if Congress and the President had not acted.
27 5
Rather, this desire for greater environmental protection would have
been channeled toward other ends, potentially resulting in greater
state and local regulation, the removal of regulatory obstacles to
public nuisance actions and greater local initiative, the evolution of
common law doctrines to accommodate the needs of environmental
litigation, or the adoption of measures designed to supplement and
enhance traditional common law protections. There is no reason to
believe that the adoption of federal command-and-control regula-
274. The presumption that an alternative regulatory arrangement
will yield a perfect outcome if only the proper ideals are enshrined
into law is a common pathology of environmental politics. See gen-
erally David Schoenbrod, Protecting the Environment in the Spirit of
the Common Law, THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 8-9
(Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000).
275. Tseming Yang, Environmental Regulation, Tort Law and En-
vironmental Justice: What Could Have Been, 41 WASH. L.J. 607,
618 (2002).
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tions was the only means of providing the level of environmental
protection demanded by an ecologically awakened public.
It is quite possible to conceive of alternative regulatory frame-
works that could have been developed to complement and build
upon common law environmental protections and those state and
local programs which were more successful. 276 The administrative
state is not without its problems and there are many aspects of the
common law framework that make it well suited to address certain
aspects of environmental problems. 277 Measures to reinforce prop-
erty rights, ensure the vitality of private and public nuisance actions,
and perhaps to provide scientific, technical and financial support to
state and local agencies may have been a viable alternative. As
the fables of the Cuyahoga River fires illustrate, policymakers may
have been too quick to dismiss the potential of such alternatives.
CONCLUSION
As the evidence presented here suggests, it is not clear that the
1969 fire can be labeled a product of the "common law era" 279 as
common law remedies were preempted or limited in important re-
spects. Nor can blame for the 1969 fire be laid at the feet of local
indifference. Many factors conspired to contribute to the Cuya-
hoga's sorry condition, defying the effort to construct a simple, un-
ambiguous narrative. Federal legislation was no doubt enacted due
to dissatisfaction with the status quo, but that dissatisfaction was not
necessarily with the common law proper, or even with the common
law as it could have been. Rather it was a dissatisfaction with the
institutional structure that had allowed for a particular environmental
legacy. The new federal legislation was also the product of dissatis-
276. See Schoenbrod, supra note 274.
277. See supra note 176 and citations therein.
278. The potential for such alternative approaches to environmental
policy are explored in Adler, Stand or Deliver, supra note 197, at
69-82 (discussing property-based environmental protection); and
Adler, Let 50 Flowers Bloom, supra note 127 (discussing the bene-
fits of state and local environmental policies). See generally Jona-
than H. Adler, Free & Green: A New Approach to Environmental
Protection, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 653 (2001).
279. Cross, supra note 173, at 977.
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faction with existing state efforts, with the indeterminacy of the
permitting system (or lack thereof) under the Rivers and Harbors
Act, and the horrendous environmental condition much of the coun-
try was in.
These conclusions are somewhat tentative. While it is relatively
easy to identify the failings of existing fables, it is difficult to con-
struct an alternative narrative that does not present problems of its
own. History, unlike a fable, is nuanced and complex. The histori-
cal record surrounding the 1969 Cuyahoga River fire is open to vari-
ous interpretations. There are many threads which may be woven
together to generate many different fables. Some will be more con-
sistent with the data than others. None will be a perfect fit.
This article has suggested limitations or failings in the conven-
tional fables of the Cuyahoga, and tentatively presents an alternative
narrative to explain the fate of Ohio's crooked river. This narrative,
like the others, may be a fable. As such, it may fail to represent ade-
quately the full complexity of the Cuyahoga's history. Yet this nar-
rative - like any good fable - contains a "useful truth" and can in-
form the unending search for more perfect institutions of environ-
mental protection.
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